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et al.: The Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act: A Preliminary Analys
THE MINNESOTA CRIME
VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Until recently, the primaryfocus of criminaljustice systems everywhere
has been upon the criminal-the apprehension, trial, conviction, sentencing, and incarcerationof the perpetratorof the crime. The victim,
in many instances, has been left unaided andforgotten. The Minnesota
Legislature responded to this problem, in 1974, by enacting the Crime
Victims ReparationsAct. The Act is, in essence, an insurancepolicy of
last resortfor victims of crimes in Minnesota. This Note examines the
scope of the Act and the proceduresfor obtaining recovery.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the last quarter-century our criminal justice system has been the
subject of increased public scrutiny. Prompted by a spiraling crime rate,'
those entrusted with law enforcement have begun to reassess present methods
of crime prevention2 with a view toward increasing the system's effectiveness.'
Courts increasingly have become cognizant of the constitutional rights of
defendants.' The public's new awareness of the shortcomings of the system

I. An examination of U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 49
(1975) reveals the following rates of serious offenses known to police per 100,000 inhabitants:
Year:
Rate:

1960
1,887

1965
2,449

1968
3,370

1969
3,680

1970
3,985

1971
4,165

1972
3,961

1973
4,154

1974
4,850

1975
5,282

These statistics represent a dramatic 179.9% increase over the fifteen year period. It is worth
noting that for national reporting purposes, the figures cover only the more serious crimes of
murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle
theft. Id. at 49 n.2. The lesser crimes, in the millions, go unreported. R. CLARK, CRIME IN
AMERICA 48 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Chappel, Geis & Hardt, Explorations in Deterrence and Criminal Justice, 8
CRIM. L. BULL. 514 (1972) (proposals for research on deterrence); Matthews, Cities Can Control
Crime, 54 CHI. B. REC. 83 (1972); Schoenfeld, Psychoanalysis, Criminal Justice Planning and
Reform, and the Law, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 313 (1971); cf National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, FinalReport, 34 MODERN L. REV. 75 (1971). See generallySymposium -Perspectives on Innovation and Reform in CriminalJustice, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 139
(1973).
3. See Byrn, Urban Law Enforcement:A Plea From the Ghetto, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 125 (1969)
(NAACP proposal to decrease the crime rate in the ghetto through greater police protection,
severe mandatory sentences for certain" offenses, and increased public awareness); Lumbard,
Some Consequences of the CriminalJustice Revolution, 56 GEo. L.J. 645 (1968) (protection
of defendants vis-a-vis efficiency of law enforcement); Thornburgh, Are We Really Serious
About the Crime Problem?, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 587 (1970) (need for a more rational approach
to increasing crime problems through decriminalization, education, increased rehabilitation
efforts, and reorganization of existing law enforcement units); Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York County Lawyer's Association, Report. 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 137 (1969)
(recommending legislation to strengthen fairness and effectiveness in law enforcement);
Roles and Responsibilities in Crime Prevention:A Symposium, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 66 (1969).
4. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (unreasonable search of automobile); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I (1970) (preliminary hearing a "critical stage" of the
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and the deplorable condition of our correctional programs5 has led to the
development of alternative methods of rehabilitation.' In the wake of this
reassessment, however, the crime victim often has been relegated to a position of subordinate priority, if not forgotten. 7 After the offender has been
tried, convicted, and sentenced, the expense of the injury, in many instances,
criminal process at which defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel); Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436 (1970) (fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy embodies collateral
estoppel as a constitutional requirement); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) ("stop and
frisk"): Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (inadmissibility of pretrial confession obtained
without informing defendant of fifth amendment guarantees); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964) (denial of defendant's request for counsel during police interrogation violates sixth
and fourteenth amendments): Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right of an indigent
defendant to have the assistance of counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary
doctrine of fourth amendment applicable to state prosecutions). But see United States v.
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (warrantless search and seizure of clothing as incident to lawful
custodial arrest); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (warrantless search of person
arrested for failure to have an operator's license); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) (search incident to arrest for traffic violation); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
("stop and frisk" allowed when ample reason to fear for safety).
5. See, e.g., Amos, The Philosophy of Corrections: Revisited, 38 FED. PROBATION 43
(Mar.. 1974): Clendenen, What's the Matter with Corrections?, 35 FED. PROBATION 8 (Sept.,
1971) (correctional institution should not view itself as a hospital attempting to cure the "sick");
Keldgord & Norris, New Directions for Corrections, 36 FED. PROBATION 3 (Mar., 1972)
(California correction system lacks, inter alia, an agreement on goals, a contemporary organizational structure, a public education program regarding corrections, and proper allocation of
funds): National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Correction in the United States, 13 CRIME
& DELIN. I (1967) (text of survey conducted for President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice); Rubin, Needed-New Legislation in Correction, 17 CRIME &
DELIN. 392 (1971) (proposes legislation to provide substantive rights for ex-prisoners rather than
allow uncontrolled exercise of judicial and administrative discretion); Symposium-Sentencing
and Corrections, II AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1972): Symposium: The Purposes of CorrectionsDirections for Improvement, 6 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 1 (1971); Note, And the Walls Came
Tumbling Down, 19 N.Y.L.F. 609 (1974) (predicts demise of punishment and prisons as a means
of dealing with offenders); Note, Courts, Corrections, and the Eighth Amendment Encouraging
Prison Reform by Releasing Inmates, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1060 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Enomoto, Participation in Correctional Management by Offender Self-Help
Groups, 36 FED. PROBATION 36 (June, 1972): Hamilton, Criminal Rehabilitation Should Be
Our Top Priority, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 225 (1971) (coordination of private as well as public sectors
to provide job opportunities and training); Murphy & Murphy, College as a Parole Plan, 35
FED. PROBATION 45 (Mar., 1971): Schoen, PORT. A New Concept of Community-Based
Correction, 36 FED. PROBATION 35 (Sept., 1972) (live-in and community-based treatment program): Sterling & Harty, An Alternative Model of Community Services for EV-Offenders and
Their Families, 36 FED. PROBATION 31 (Sept., 1972) (follow-up services for ex-prisoners); Wenk
& Frank, Some Progress in the Evaluation of Institutional Programs, 37 FED. PROBATION 30
(Sept., 1973): Williams & Fish, Rehabilitation and Economic Self-Interest, 17 CRIME & DELIN.
406 (1971) (proposal that release of prisoners be dependent upon achievement of certain goals
which system will then credit toward total release "price").
7. In a notable project in 1975, however, the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention
and Control granted awards totaling $162,773 for both a Minnesota program for victims of
sexual assault and for a research project on remedies for victims of crime. See 3 MINN. CRIME
PREV. & CONTROL 4-5 (June, 1975) (corrections projects S-24 and S- 17).
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is borne by the crime victim alone.'
The victim's plight is revealed by a survey of the traditional means of
recovery.' A civil action for damages against the offender is often unrealistic.
It requires the apprehension of the offender, which is estimated to occur in
connection with only one of every five reported crimes.' 0 Furthermore, the
offender is often judgment-proof," or his resources may be depleted by defending both criminal and civil actions, paying fines, and supporting dependents while incarcerated." In addition, a high percentage of crime victims are
members of lower income groups" who are simply unable to bear the expense
of civil litigation.
8. See Comment, Rehabilitationof the Victims of Crime: An Overview, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
317(1973).
9. See generally Comment, supra note 8, at 319-47. The view that enforcement of the criminal
laws should be concerned with the individual interests of the victims as well as the public welfare
is outside the mainstream of classical theories of criminal law. It has, however, drawn support
from such dissimilar sources as Jeremy Bentham and Arthur J. Goldberg. See J. BENTHAM,
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 317-18 (1864); Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 205,224 (1964).
One alternative which has been advanced is the development of direct civil responsibility by
the state to the victims of crime by the creation or extension of a tort duty to protect citizens
from victimization. See Kutner, Crime-Torts: Due Processof Compensationfor Crime Victims,
41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 487 (1966) ("crime-tort" provides a pedagogical framework for a crime
victim's action against a governmental unit); cf Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240
N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (city not liable in tort for failure to provide police protection upon request). The greatest obstacle to the development of such an action, of course, is the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Over the last decade, however, courts have become increasingly
disrespectful of the doctrine. See, e.g., Nieting v. Blondell, __
Minn. __
, 235 N.W.2d 597
(1975) (state of Minnesota tort immunity abolished with respect to tort claims arising on or
after August 1, 1976). In response to Nieting the Minnesota legislature in 1976 enacted the Minnesota Tort Claims Act regulating suit against the state. See Act of Apr. 20, 1976, ch. 331, § 33,
[1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1293-97, to be codifiedas MINN. STAT. § 3.736.
Another alternative has been legislation permitting recovery by victims of mob crime. See,
e.g., Note, Municipal Tort Liability: Statutory Liability of Municipalitiesfor Damage Caused
by Mobs and Riots, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 699 (1965); Legislation, Communal Liability for Mob
Violence, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1936).
10. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 157
(96th ed. 1975) (19.1 arrests per 100 offenses in 1973); U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 176 (1974) (19.4 arrests per 100 offenses in 1974).
11.Mueller, Compens'ation for Victims of Crime: Thought Before Action, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 213, 216 (1965). See I L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN
AMERICAN STATE COURTS 7-8 (1965) (43 percent of felons indigent for purpose of appointing
counsel, 56 percent unable to raise bail); Goldberg, supra note 9, at 224 n.95 (1964) (assets of
accused may be exhausted by attorneys' fees); Lamborn, Remedies for the Victims of Crime,
43 S.CAL. L. REV. 22, 38 (1970).
12. Comment, supra note 8, at 319.
13. Approximately 54 percent of the crime victims in 1965 had incomes less than $6,000. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 145 (93d ed.

1972). A more recent study suggests that the victimization rates in 1972 were even greater in low
income groups. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIME IN EIGHT AMERICAN CITIES 12-19, 21-28 (Advance Report 1974) (sample drawn from

Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland, and St. Louis).
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A second alternative means of recovery, court-ordered restitution, suffers
additional infirmities. Although the use of restitution-a supervised program
of repayment by the offender to the victim-is sanctioned in most jurisdictions as a condition to probation or other sentence,14 it is almost exclusively
ordered only in those cases involving property crimes."5 As with civil litigation, the impecunious position of the defendant often renders restitution
impractical. 6 Suggestions have been made that offenders use their prison
wages to meet restitution payments. 7 Although most inmates are employed,
the majority are generally paid nominal wages.'" Moreover, restitution from
prison earnings diverts resources which could be used to support the families
or dependents of prisoners. 9 Finally, objections have been raised regarding
the constitutionality of the use of restitution. It is contended that restitution
as a condition of probation or parole operates to free the wealthy from
prison sentences, thereby violating equal protection guarantees.20 In addition,
if failure to comply with the requirements of restitution results in incarceration, it might subject an offender to imprisonment for debt.21
14. Note, Use of Restitution in the Criminal Process: People v. Miller, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
456, 460 (1969). But see Comment, Compensation for Victims of Crime, 33 U. CHI. L. REV.
531, 533 (1966). The victim's civil action is unaffected by conditioning probation on restitution,
but such payments would probably offset the award of civil damages. Jacob, Reparation or
Restitution by the Criminal Offender to his Victim: Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the
Modern Correctional Process, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 152, 156 (1970).
15. Schultz, The Violated: A Proposal to Compensate Victims of Violent Crime, 10 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 238, 243-44 (1965); Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50
MINN. L. REV. 223, 229 (1965). For a discussion of the use of reparations and restitution in the
modern criminal justice system, see Jacob, supra note 14.
16. In addition, some commentators feel that restitution, instead of evoking in the offender
a sense of responsibility or alleviating feelings of guilt, may well increase his resentment and
aggressiveness. Silving, Book Review, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 96,98-99 (1961).
17. See, e.g.. Mueller, supra note 11, at 221; Wolfgang, supra note 15, at 230 n.25.
18. Of those inmates in Minnesota who are employed, the majority earn from $1.50 to $3.50
per day in prison industries. A small number work in private industry projects, earning $6,000
to $10,000 per year. Letter from Stanley Wood, Director of Private Industry, Minn. Dep't of
Corrections to William Mitchell Law Review, Oct. 8, 1976.
19. This unfairly burdens the family and dependents of the offender and leads to further
resentment of the system. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO THE VICTIMS OF
CRIME 6 (1974). See Schultz, supra note 15, at 244. But see S. SCHAFER, RESTITUTION TO
VICTIMS OF CRIME 125 (1960); Eglash, Creative Restitution: Some Suggestions for Prison
Rehabilitation Programs, 20 AM. J. CORRECTION 20 (Nov.-Dec., 1958).
20. Note, New York Crime Victims Compensation Board Act: Four Years Later. 7 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 25, 46 (1971). See also Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old
CorrectionalAim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. REV. 243,252 (1965).
21. Schultz, supra note 15, at 244; Comment, supra note 8, at 324-25; cf Exparte Morse, 26
Ariz. 450, 454, 226 P. 537, 539 (1924) (dictum) (incarceration of employer for inability to pay
wages constitutes imprisonment for debt); People v. Holder, 53 Cal. App. 45, 50, 199 P. 832,
834 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (California constitution prohibits imprisonment of a contractor for
breach of agreement to pay debts). But cf Martin v. People, 69 Colo. 60, 61, 168 P. 1171, 1171
(1917) (incarceration for willful failure to support child is not imprisonment for debt); Ex parte
Merill, 200 Mich. 244, 249, 167 N.W. 30, 32 (1918) (incarceration for refusal to perform a court
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Another alternative is to return offenders to the community where they
can secure employment, thereby enabling them to compensate the crime
victim. 22 Many states, including Minnesota, 23 have implemented halfway
house programs and other community treatment centers. 24 This approach,
like court-ordered restitution, is apparently more feasible where only property loss is involved2 5 because less difficulty is encountered in arriving at a
repayment plan which is mutually agreeable to both the victim and the
2
offender. 1
A final alternative is privately-obtained insurance." However, recognizing
that a high proportion of crimes occur in lower income neighborhoods28 and

order requiring transfer of monies is not imprisonment for debt). The Minnesota constitution
provides in article 1, § 12 that "[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt in this state .... "
The Minnesota Supreme Court has construed the term "debt" to mean "an obligation to pay
money for something due and owing from one to another arising out of a contract, express or
implied." See Clausen v. Clausen, 250 Minn. 293, 301, 84 N.W.2d 675, 681 (1957). Thus, it
would appear that if the offender and the victim entered into an agreement for restitution, failure
to pay would constitute a debt for which the offender could not be imprisoned.
22. These programs not only assist the offender in finding employment, but may also continue
education and training programs started in correctional institutions. G. KILLINGER & P. CROMWELL, JR., CORRECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY: ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT 137 (1974).
Employment counseling specialists in federal prerelease guidance centers aid the offenders in
procuring employment. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 41 (1967).
23. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL, RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS (1975).
24. See G. KILLINGER & P. CROMWELL, JR., supra note 22, at 130-31 (28 states maintain
some type of program for felons prior to release on parole). Maryland, Washington, and New
York have initiated work release programs by statute. Comment, supra note 8, at 328 n.52.
25. Many victims are more interested in restoring their property than in incarcerating the
offender. Frequently, the offender will suggest to the victim that he will restore the property if
the victim will refrain from prosecuting. Wolfgang, supra note 15, at 229 n.2 1.
26. Where the only damage has been to property and not to the victim himself, the atmosphere is more conducive to negotiation. See also Comment, supra note 8, at 323 (property
damage more easily measured than physical or emotional injury).
27. In the absence of express exclusion from coverage under the policy, damages or death
caused by intentional acts or acts in violation of law are generally compensable under life, accident, medical, and other personal insurance policies. See IA J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 486, 511 (rev. ed. 1965). See generally Starrs, A Modest Proposal to Insure
Justicefor Victims of Crime, 50 MINN. L. REV. 285, 301-05 (1965). See also INSTITUTE OF LIFE
INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 88 (1975) (.8% of life insurance policy holders die
from homicide).
The Minnesota court has allowed recovery under a life insurance policy even where the insured
was allegedly committing a felony at the time of his death. Domico v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 191 Minn. 215, 217-20, 253 N.W. 538, 540 (1934) ("The omission of an exception in the
instant policy from liability if insured should be killed while committing a felony by the same
reasoning precludes exemption of liability here.").
28. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 80 (1967). See also U.S. LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, CRIMES AND VICTIMS: A REPORT OF THE
DAYTON-SAN JOSE PILOT SURVEY OF VICTIMIZATION 100-0 1 (1974).
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to members of lower income groups, 9 the high premiums for such coverage
render this alternative to be of little practical significance. 0
The inadequacy of these more traditional means of recovery has led to the
conclusion that the only feasible method by which crime victims can be compensated is through public assumption of the responsibility. The reasons
offered in justification of the use of public funds include the failure of those
entrusted with law enforcement to prevent crime,"' the negligence of public
officers, 32 and the denial of equal protection to crime victims by failing to
secure for them the peace and welfare enjoyed by the general public.3 Regardless of the theory under which publicly-funded programs proceed, the
root of public crime victim compensation is the "humanitarian desire to alle3
viate the suffering of victims of violence."

1

In 1967, California enacted the first crime victims reparations program in
the United States.3 5 Several other states have since followed California's
lead,'3 including Minnesota in 1974.31 This Note will discuss the provisions of
Minnesota's Crime Victims Reparations Act, the policies which should influ29. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
supra note 28, at 15;note 13 supra.
30. See Lamborn, supra note 11,at 42-43. For example, in 1969, 37 percent of adults with
less than $5,000 family income had no life insurance. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE
INSURANCE FACT BOOK 12 (1974). In 1967, 65 percent of the persons under 65 with family
income of less than $3,000 were without hospitalization insurance. Also, 43 percent of the persons under 65 with family incomes between $3,000 and $5,000 had no hospitalization coverage.
Reed & Carr, Private Health Insurancein the United States, 1967. 32 SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 8
(Feb., 1969).
31. Comment, supra note 8,at 333 & n.75. First propounded by Jeremy Bentham, this argument has been offered in favor of allowing a crime victim to bring a civil action against the
government for breach of both contractual and tort duties. See Kutner, supra note 9, at 487. It is
generally admitted, however, that a state cannot prevent all crimes.
32. Comment, supra note 8, at 334 & n.77.
33. Id. at 335.
34. Goldberg, Preface to Symposium: Governmental Compensation for Victims of Violence,
43 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,1 (1970).
35. See Act of Aug. 30, 1967, ch. 1546, § 1, [1967] Cal. Sess. Laws 3707-09. Two years later,
California enacted a "good Samaritan" statute providing compensation to private citizens who
incurred injury, death, or damage in preventing a crime, apprehending a criminal, or rescuing
another in immediate danger of injury or death. See Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1431, § 3.5, [1969]
Cal. Sess. Laws 2938-39.
36. Prior to passage of the Minnesota Act eight states had enacted crime victims reparations
legislation. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.67.010-.180 (1974), as amended. (Supp. 1975); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 71-84
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1801 to :1821 (West Supp. 1976); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 26A, §§ 1-17 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
258A, §§ 1-7 (Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-1 to -21 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§
620-35 (McKinney 1972), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975). Subsequent to the passage of
the Minnesota Act six states enacted crime victims reparations legislation. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. I1,§§ 9001-14 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-13-01 to -20 (Supp. 1975); Act of
June 6, 1976, act 139, [1976] Pa. Legis. Serv. 273-79 (West), to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, §§ 180-7 to -7.15; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.1 to .18 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE
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ence its development, and the difficulties which may be encountered in its
operation.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MINNESOTA ACT

The Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act18 indemnifies victims of
crime or their dependents for economic loss incurred as a direct result of
personal injury or death which is in turn a direct result of a crime. 9 The Act
also'permits recovery for economic loss incurred as a direct result of a good
§§ 7.68.010-.910 (Supp. 1976); Act of June 6, 1976, ch. 344, [19761 Wis. Legis. Serv.
1619-24 (West), to be codified as Wis. STAT. §§ 949.01-.18. Rhode Island passed a reparations
statute which will become effective 120 days after enactment of federal reparations legislation.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 12-25-1 to -12 (Supp. 1975). In 1968, the territory of the Virgin
Islands enacted the Virgin Islands Criminal Victims Compensation Act. See V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 34, §§ 151-77 (Supp. 1975).
37. Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act, Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 463, [1974] Minn.
Sess. Laws 1132-40, codified as MINN. STAT. §§299B.01-.16. Prior to enactment of the Crime
Victims Reparations Act, compensation through the state claims commission was available
under a "good Samaritan" statute to innocent persons injured and dependents of such persons
killed as a result of an attempt to help a victim of crime, an attempt to apprehend or arrest a
suspected criminal, or an attempt to aid a police officer. Act of June 6, 1969, ch. 1018, § 1,
(1969] Minn. Sess. Laws 2045, codified as MINN. STAT. § 3.74(7). In 1971 S.F. 226, 67th Minn.
Legis. (1971) was introduced in the Minnesota legislature to allow innocent victims of crime to
apply to the state claims commission for compensation. The legislature failed to approve the
amendment, undoubtedly due to the complete lack of claims under the "good Samaritan"
statute. See Tape of Joint Meeting on S.F. 884 Before the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the
Judiciaryand the Minnesota House Comm. on Crime Prevention & Corrections(Nov. 13, 1973).
Between 1971 and 1973, the idea of compensating crime victims through a state-funded program was extensively considered. While the desirability of having a crime victims reparations
program provided little controversy, formal legislative consideration of a program was postponed
until 1973 due to concern over the program's potential cost and the appropriate procedural
mechanisms. See MINN. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE'S SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW,
INTERIM ACTIVITIES & RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (Nov., 1971-Dec., 1972). Several bills proposing a
compensation program were introduced in the 1973 Session. S.F. 530, 68th Minn. Legis., Ist
Sess. (1973) included a need test and gave jurisdiction to the claims committee of the legislature
to proces claims. S.F. 549, 68th Minn. Legis., Ist Sess. (1973) and S.F. 1089, 68th Minn. Legis.,
1st Sess. (1973) were very similar to S.F. 530 except they limited indemnity to medical expenses
alone. S.F. 884, 68th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1973) eliminated the need test and provided for
settlement of claims by the attorney general and trial of contested cases in state district court. During
the following year the bills were studied by legislative committees, which expressed a concern
that administrative expenses be kept at a minimum so a substantial amount of the appropriations would directly reach the innocent victims of crime. See, e.g., Tape of Meeting on S.F. 884
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law & Correctionsof the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary (Oct. 9, 1973); Tape of Joint Meeting on S.F. 884 Before the Minnesota Senate Comm.
on the Judiciaryand the Minnesota House Comm. on Crime Prevention & Corrections(Nov. 13,
1973); Tape of Meeting on S.F. 884 Before the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the Judiciary(Feb.
14, 1974). When H.F. 452 was finally enacted, the legislature had established a reparations
board to administer the program rather than using the courts or the state claims commission.
38. The Act became effective July I, 1974. See Act of Apr. II, 1974, ch. 463, § 17, [1974]
Minn. Sess. Laws 1140.
39. See MINN. STAT. §§299B.02(7), (9) (1974).
ANN.
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faith effort to prevent a crime or to apprehend a person suspected of engaging
in a crime.' 0 The Act is analogous to an insurance policy for the benefit of
victims of crimes committed within this state who otherwise cannot be adequately compensated.
A. Compensable Crime. To constitute a "compensable crime," the conduct
of the offender must be at least a misdemeanor under state statute, 41 pose a
substantial threat of personal injury or death,42 and occur within the state."
It is not necessary that the offender be prosecuted or convicted;" nor is it
necessary that he have the capacity under state law to commit the crime."
Excluded from the definition of "compensable crime" is conduct arising out
of the use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft, unless the offender
intends to cause personal injury or death, or the vehicle or craft was being
used in the commission of a felony and was the proximate cause of the victim's injury or death. 6
B. Eligibility. The victim, his dependents," his estate, those who have furnished him with certain necessary medical products, services, or accommodations, and their guardians, conservators, or agents are eligible claimants
under the Act.' 8 Eligibility further depends on each claimant having incurred
economic loss,'" reporting the crime to police within five days of its occurrence or within five days of the time when a report could reasonably have
been made,50 fully cooperating with the police," filing the claim within a year
of the victim's injury or death or within a year of the time the claim could

40. See id. § 299B.02(9).
41. Id.§ 299B.02(5)(a)(iii) requires that the conduct be "included within the definition of
,crime' in Minnesota Statutes 1971, Section 609.02, Subdivision 1,or would be included within
that definition but for the fact that the person engaging in the conduct lacked capacity to commit
the crime under the laws of this state." MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 1 (1974) defines crime as
"conduct which is prohibited by statute and for which the actor may be sentenced to imprisonment, with or without a fine." This would of course exclude those who commit petty misdemeanors because they are subject only to fines and do not face possible incarceration. Id. §
609.02, subd. 4a.

42.

MINN. STAT.

§299B.02(5)(a)(ii) (1974).

43. Id. § 299B.02(5)(a)(i). However, it is not necessary that the victim be a resident of Minnesota. See id. § 299B.02(9).
44. Id. § 299B.02(5)(b).
45. Id. § 299B.02(5)(a)(iii). Capacity to commit a crime is affected, for example, by age, id.
§ 609.055 (children under age 14 are incapable of committing a crime); intoxication, id. §
609.075 (capability of committing a crime requiring specific intent); and mental illness, id. §
611.026.
46. Id. § 299B.02(5)(c).
47. "Dependent" is defined as "any person who was dependent upon a deceased victim for
support at the time of the crime." Id. § 299B.02(6).
48. Id. § 299B.03, subd. I (Supp. 1975).
49. Id. " 'Economic loss' means actual economic detriment incurred as a direct result of
injury or death." Id. § 299B.02(7) (1974).
50. MINN. STAT. §299B.03, subd. 2(a) (1974).
5I. Id. § 299B.03, subd. 2(b).
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have been made,5" and having a claim in excess of $100. 53 The offender or his
accomplice, his spouse, parent, child, brother or sister, and any one living in
the household of the offender or his accomplice are excluded from eligibility.5
Eligibility may also be denied where an award would unjustly benefit the
5
offender or an accomplice.
C. Recovery. The Minnesota Act provides compensation for a broader
range of losses than the act of any other state. Compensation for reasonable
expenses incurred for medical and other specified therapeutic care which is
necessary to the victim's rehabilitation is provided for in the Act, 56 as is compensation for loss of income, and for child care and household services to
substitute for those normally provided by the victim.57 In the event of the
victim's death, the Act similarly provides compensation for substitute child
care and household services,5" the host of medical and rehabilitative services
for which the victim's survivors or estate are liable,5" as well as for loss of
support and reasonable funeral expenses." The amount of reparations recoverable for a single injury or death is limited to ten thousand dollars.6 ' The
52. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 193, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 657, amending MINN. STAT. §
299B.03, subd. 2(e) (1974).
53. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subd. 2(f) (1974).
54. Id. § 299B.03, subds. 2(c)-(d). For all claimants other than the offender or his accomplice,
the exclusion may be modified at the discretion of the Crime Victims Reparations Board where
justice requires. Id. § 299B.03, subd. 2(c).
55. Id. § 299B.03, subd. 2(d).
56. See id. §§299B.02(7)(a)(i)-(ii).
57. Id. §§ 299B.02(7)(a)(iii)-(iv).
58. Id. § 299B.02(7)(b)(iv).
59. Id. § 299B.02(7)(b)(ii) includes in the description of economic loss reasonable expenses for
certain medical services incurred prior to the victim's death and for which the victim's estate
or survivors are liable.
60. Id. §§ 299B.02(7)(b)(i), (iii). The Crime Victims Reparations Board has established a
maximum of $1,850 (minus the $100 deduction required under id. § 299B.04(2)) as the amount
which can be recovered for funeral expenses. Minutes of Crime Victims Reparations Board,
Nov. 19, 1974, at 2. This determination was based on a survey of area funeral directors and
the Association of Funeral Directors. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director
of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Sept. 1,
1976. The amount was thought to be a more realistic amount than the $1,000 burial allowance
under the Workers' Compensation Act, codified at id. § 176.111, subd. 18. Letter from Samuel
L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William
Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976.
61. MINN. STAT. § 299B.04(3) (1974). When H.F. 452, 68th Minn. Legis., 2d Sess. (1974)
was reported on by the Committee on Appropriations, a $10,000 limit was proposed. See
4 MINN. H.R. JOUR. 6204 (1974). Six days later the Committee on Rules and Administration
recommended amendment of H.F. 452 to comply with S.F. 884, 68th Minn. Legis., 2d Sess.
(1974) and substitution of H.F. 452 for S.F. 884. This recommendation limited recovery to
$15,000 plus attorneys' fees. See 4 MINN. S. JOUR. 5603, 5607 (1974). Subsequently, the conference committee recommended amendment of H.F. 452 to include a $10,000 limitation and to
delete the provision for attorneys' fees. See 4 MINN. S. JOUR. 7075 (1974). This version of the
bill was read a third time and passed by the Senate and House of Representatives. See 4 MINN.
S. JoUR. 6149-56 (1974); 4 MINN. H.R. JOUR. 7072-80 (1974).
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award will be reduced by any amount received from "collateral sources,""2 by
the first one hundred dollars of loss, 3 and by an amount commensurate with
the contributory misconduct of the victim or other claimant. 4 The award is
exempt from execution or attachment, except by those who have provided
services or products in connection with the victim's injury or death.65 These
suppliers may also be paid directly by the Board.66
D. Administration and Claims Procedure. The Act is administered by the
Crime Victims Reparations Board. The Board, composed of three members
appointed by the governor to six-year terms, 7 in turn employs an Executive
Director to handle the day-to-day operations. The filing of a claim under the
Act is straightforward. To avoid intimidation of potential claimants, only
two simple forms are utilized," which include an authorization by the claimant to release all records and information relating to the incident by hospitals,
doctors, and law enforcement agencies. In contrast to programs in other
states, 9 the burden is then on the Board to obtain from the claimant and
other persons all information reasonably related to the validity of the claim.'0
When a claim is filed with the Board, it is assigned by the chairman to one
of the members for investigation and, if necessary, a hearing. A determination is made whether the claim should be paid and, if so, in what amount., A
written report, stating the reasons for the investigating member's decision, is
then filed with the Board.72 A single member's decision may be appealed to
62. MINN. STAT. § 299B.04(l) (1974). Id. § 299B.02(4) defines "collateral source" as a source
of benefits or advantages for economic loss which the victim has received or which is readily
available to him. Collateral sources of benefits include the offender, the government, social
security, workers' compensation, wage continuation plans, insurance, and gifts. Id.
63. Id. § 299B.04(2).
64. Id.
65. Id.§ 299B.09.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 299B.05. Of the three, one must be a member of the Minnesota bar and another must
be a licensed medical or osteopathic physician. Id. § 299B.05, subd. 1.
68. A claim is initiated by filing a one-page "Preliminary Claim Form" containing information about the claimant, a description of the incident, and the name of the law enforcement

agency to which it was reported. 9

MINN. REGS., REPAR. BOARD

RB4-A (1974); Minn. Dep't

of Public Safety Form No. 8001 (Oct., 1974). This form is relied upon by the Board in determining the initial validity of the claim and whether the statutory requirements have been met.
The claimant must then complete a more detailed "Supplementary Form," in which he specifies
the economic loss incurred and possible collateral sources of recovery. Minn. Dep't of Public
Safety Form No. 8004 (Mar., 1976).
69. Other states place a significant burden on the claimant to supply all of the medical reports,
receipts, and other materials necessary to support his claim. In Maryland, for example, the
prospective claimant is advised to submit with the claim form all medical reports and receipts
in support of the claim. 6 MARYLAND CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP.
8 (1975). Similarly, in Alaska the claimant must supply doctors' reports, hospital reports, and
employment information before any action will be taken on his claim. 2 ALASKA VIOLENT
CRIMES COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP. 10 (1975).

70.9 MINN. REGS., REPAR. BOARD RB6-(a) (1974).
71. MINN. STAT. § 299B.07 (1974).
72. Id. § 299B.07, subd. 5. The average length of time required for finalizing a claim ranges
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the full Board by either the claimant or another Board member within thirty
days of receipt or filing of the decision.73 Contested cases are subject to
judicial review in compliance with the Minnesota Administrative Procedure
Act.74 Upon its own motion, or upon motion of the claimant or the attorney
general, the Board may grant an emergency award in cases of hardship, and
may reconsider any decision granting or denying reparations or determining
their amount. 5 The claimant bears the burden of proof and is required to
establish that the requirements for compensation have been met by a preponderance of the evidence." But the final conviction of the offender is
conclusive proof of the commission of the crime. 7
E. Current Operations. Most claims to date have been for injuries or
death as a result of an assault, homicide, or mugging." Approximately forty
percent of the claims have been denied, usually because the claim has been
abandoned.7 9 Between July 1, 1974, and June 30, 1976, awards in the amount
of $334,365.51 have been made, with individual awards averaging approximately $1,200. ° The initial fiscal year appropriation of $100,000 was doubled
for each of the following two years.8' In early January, 1976, however, the
from two and one-third months for a mugging to six months for arson. Minnesota Crime
Victims Reparations Board, Register of Cases Handled from July 1, 1974, through June
30, 1976, table Ill [hereinafter cited as Board Register]. These averages include delays caused
by slow return of information by the claimant and investigation of the claim by a Board member.
The Board may delay the process further by postponing or suspending proceedings while
criminal proceedings are pending, since necessary police records and witness statements will be
unavailable. MINN. STAT. § 299B.06, subd. 2(e) (1974). The Board may mitigate the effect of any
delay by using its power to grant emergency awards. Id. § 299B.06, subd. 2(g). These awards may
be granted where it is likely that an award will be made and where undue hardship would result if
immediate payment were not made. Id. But the Board has decided to grant emergency
awards to cover only actual loss of income. Minutes of Crime Victims Reparations Board, Jan.
28, 1975, at 2; Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime
Victims Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976.
73. Id. § 299B.08, subds. 1-2.
74. MINN. STAT. § 299B.08, subd. 3 states that all claims shall be treated by the Board as contested cases within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, codified at Id. §§ 15.01-.43.
MINN. STAT. § 15.042 entitles any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case to
judicial review.
75. Id. § 299B.06, subds. 2(g)-(h). The right to move for a rehearing may be exercised until
lost by appeal, the granting of a writ of certiorari, or until a reasonable time has run. 9 MINN.
REGS., REPAR. BOARD R B I 13-(a) (1974).
76. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subd. 1 (1974).
77. Id. § 299B.02(5)(b). If an application for rehearing, appeal, or petition for certiorari is
pending, or a new trial or rehearing has been ordered, a conviction is not conclusive evidence that
a crime was committed. Id.
78. Board Register, supra note 72, table II.
79. Id. table IV (228 claims denied; 100 claims treated as abandoned for failure to furnish
information "for a long period of time"). Claims were also frequently denied because they failed
to exceed the $100 deductible, were grounded on excepted property loss, or occurred before the
effective date of the Act. Id.
80. Id. table V. The total amount paid, however, was reduced by $1,939.87 in refunds to the
Board because of overpayments or claimants' subsequent recovery from collateral sources. Id.
81. See Act of May 30, 1975, ch. 204, § 31, subd. 8, [1975] Minn. Sess. Laws 571.
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Board put a moratorium on the making of awards because the reparations
fund had been exhausted. The 1976 session of the legislature supplemented
the appropriation in the amount of $200,000.2

III. ANALYSIS OF THE ACT

A. An Approach to Construing the Act
The Crime Victims Reparations Act contains no statement of policy or
other guide to assist in its construction."3 There are, however, several considerations which are helpful in this pursuit. First, the Act is remedial in nature
and thus should be accorded a liberal construction 4 in favor of the remedy
provided by law, or in favor of those entitled to the benefit of the statute.8 5 In
addition, the absence of stringent, technical requirements in the Act emphasizes the legislative intention that the process be free of overly-legalistic
procedures."'
The low initial appropriation"7 should not be viewed as evidence of a legis82. Act of Apr. 20, 1976, ch. 331, § 13, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1286 ($100,000 appropriation
for the year ending June 30, 1976: $100,000 appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1977).
83. The bill which eventually became the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act had a
declaration of public policy at the time it was originally introduced. See H.F. 452, 68th Minn.
Legis., Ist Sess. § 1 (1973). It read:
It is hereby declared that it serves a public purpose and is of benefit to the state to
indemnify those needy residents of the state of Minnesota for medical expenses actually incurred as a direct result of a violent crime, and those needy domiciliaries of
Minnesota who are injured as a consequence of an act committed in another state or
jurisdiction, when such act, if committed in Minnesota, would have been a crime
under the laws of this state; provided that the victim of such crime shall not have
insurance coverage or private resources to cover such medical expenses.
Two Senate bills, S.F. 549, 68th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. § 1 (1973), and S.F. 1089, 68th Minn.
Legis., Ist Sess. § I (1973), contained the identical declaration of policy. Another Senate bill,
S.F. 884, 68th Minn. Legis., Ist Sess. § 1 (1973), contained a similar declaration of policy, with
the exception that it did not require the indemnified residents to be "needy," nor did it contain
the proviso regarding insurance and private coverage. Although H.F. 452 was enacted it had
been amended prior to passage to conform with S.F. 884 and the declaration of public policy
had been deleted. See 4 MINN. S. JOUR. 5600, 5607 (1974).
84. It is a general rule that statutes which are regarded by the courts as being humanitarian in
purpose or which are grounded on a humane public policy are to be accorded a liberal construction. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 289 Minn. 388, 394, 184 N.W.2d 786, 791 (1971) (unemployment compensation): Adelsman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 Minn. 116, 123, 125 N.W.2d
444, 448 (1963) (same): Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 76-77, 42 N.W.2d 576,
581-82 (1950) (same).
85. E.g., Blankholm v. Fearing, 222 Minn. 51, 54, 22 N.W.2d 853, 855 (1946). Thus, where
ambiguity exists in the statutory language the intention of a remedial statute prevails over the
literal meaning of its terms. See State ex rel. Minneapolis v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 98 Minn.
380, 396-98, 108 N.W. 261, 266-67 (1906), aff'd mem., 214 U.S. 497 (1909).
86. See. e.g., MINN. STAT. § 299B.07, subd. 3 (1974) (hearing not required unless ordered by
Board member); id. § 299B.07, subd. 4 (awards made by single Board member); 9 MINN. REGS.,
REPAR. BOARD RB4-A, 6-(a), 7-(a) (1974) (simplified administrative forms).
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lative intention that the Act be interpreted strictly as to each individual
claim. Initial legislative miscalculation as to the potential dollar amount of
claims which would be filed,"t the desire to maintain low administrative overhead so that the maximum amount of the appropriation would reach the
claimants, the extension of coverage to losses not expressly included by
similar acts in other states,90 and the imposition of statutory duties to advertise the program's existence9 indicate that the cost factor was considered by
the legislature in defining the scope of coverage under the Act. The cumulative effect of these factors thus expresses a legislative intention to allow the
administrative agency and the courts to avoid concerning themselves with
economics when construing the Act's substantive provisions in a particular

87. In 1974 $100,000 was appropriated from the general fund for organization, operation,
administration, and staffing of the Board. Act of Apr. I1, 1974, ch. 463, § 18, [1974] Minn. Sess.
Laws 1140. When the original bill came out of the Committee on Appropriations, a recommendation that $150,000 be appropriated annually was adopted by the House of Representatives. See 4 MINN. H.R. JOUR. 6200, 6207 (1974). Six days later the Senate approved a recommendation that a mere $25,000 be appropriated. See 4 MINN. S. JOUR. 5606-07 (1974). The
House of Representatives refused to concur in this amendment, and a motion to appoint a conference committee prevailed. See 4 MINN. H.R. JOUR. 6833 (1974). The $100,000 appropriation
was a product of the conference committee. See id. at 7072, 7079.
88. The experience of other states indicated the initial $100,000 appropriation would be
adequate. In the first five months after enactment of Hawaii's crime reparations act, three
awards were made for a total of $1,000, and in the following 12 months 47 awards were given for
a total of $111,945.23. I HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMM'N, ANN. REP. 3
(1968): 2 HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMM'N, ANN. REP. 2-3 (1969). Similarly,

Maryland's compensation board reported 42 awards totalling $66,723 after the first year of
operation. I MARYLAND CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP. 5, 8 (1969).
New Jersey's first compensation board report covered 20 months from November I, 1971, to
June 30, 1973. In that time period, 107 claimants received a total of $219,748.07, or approximately SI 10,000 for 12 months. I NEW JERSEY VIOLENT CRIMES COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN.
REP. 1,3 (1973). However, by January of 1976 the Board had exhausted the appropriations for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and put a moratorium on further awards until additional
funds were obtained. Minutes of Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board, Jan. 23, 1976.
89. See text accompanying notes 67-77 supra.
90. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 299B.02(7) (a) (i)-(ii), .02(8) (1974) with, e.g., ALASKA STAT.

§ 18.67.110 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1975) and GA. CODE § 47-523 (1974) and MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 5 (Supp. 1976). A few states do not clearly delineate the scope of reparation awards, using such language as "expenses actually and reasonably incurred," "pecuniary
loss," and "out-of-pocket loss." See ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.110 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1975);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-33 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 5 (Supp. 1976);

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B- 12 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(2) (McKinney 1972).
Extension of coverage is promoted by the absence of any residency or need requirements for
claimants. See MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(9) (1974); note 83 supra. In contrast, several states deny
an award if the claimant will not suffer undue financial hardship. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.080
(c) (1974) (reparations board may consider victim's need for financial aid); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:1813(A) (Supp. 1976) (no award shall be made unless applicant will suffer undue hardship);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12(o (Supp. 1975) (same for specified claimants).
91. MINN. STAT.§§299B.06subd. l(d), .15(1974).
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case. Instead, each case should be treated on its own merits without concern
for the size of the claim other than the statutory limits.9" In short, a concern
for the cost of an individual's claim should not compromise the Act's primary
purpose of alleviating a claimant's financial burden arising as a direct result
of the crime. The acts of other states which were considered by the legislature
in drafting the Minnesota Act,93 the general rules of statutory construction,94
and judicial interpretations of general principles of indemnity under insurance law9 5 are also helpful tools of construction.
B. Eligibilityfor Reparations
Before an award will be made, certain requirements must be met. The
claimant must not be a member of a class of excluded claimants; 96 the crime
must be reported to the police within five days of its occurrence or of the time
when the report could reasonably have been made;97 the victim or claimant
must cooperate fully with the police;9" the claim must be filed within a year of
the victim's injury or death or within a year of the time when it could have
been made; 99 and the amount claimed must be at least $100.101
92. The statutory limitation is $10,000. Id. § 299B.04(3) (1974). Thus, it was possible that
only 10 claimants could have recovered the first year the Act was in effect. See Act of Apr. 11,
1974, ch. 463, § 18, [1974] Minn. Sess. Laws 1140 ($100,000 appropriation). The annual appropriation for subsequent years have been tripled, thereby relieving the financial pinch initially
felt by the Board. See Act of Apr. 20, 1976, ch. 331, § 13, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1286
($100,000 appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1976; $100,000 appropriation for the year
ending June 30, 1977); Act of May 30, 1975, ch. 204, § 31, subd. 8, [1975] Minn. Sess. Laws 571
($200,000 appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1976; $200,000 appropriation for the year
ending June 30, 1977).
93. See note 36 supra. Since these acts are relatively new, only a small number of cases have
dealt with crime victims acts. See, e.g., Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486,
331 A.2d 55 (1975); Hicks v. Hatem, 265 Md. 260, 264 n.1, 289 A.2d 325, 327 n.l (1972)
(dictum); Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 262 Md. 115, 119, 277 A.2d 57,
59 (1971) (dictum); Gurley v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 595, 296 N.E.2d 477 (1973); In re
Hollywood, 124 N.J. Super. 50, 304 A.2d 747 (App. Div. 1973); Weisinger v. Van Rensselaer,
79 Misc. 2d 1023, 326 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zamenick, 76 Misc.
2d 1, 350 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Johnson v. Nissman, 39 App. Div. 578, 331 N.Y.S.2d
796 (1972); Hayes v. Van Rensselaer, 69 Misc. 2d 315, 329 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
Significance can be attached to the incorporation or rejection of provisions of acts before the
legislature.
94. MINN. STAT. §§ 645.08-.43 (1974).
95. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974); Olson v.
Village of Babbitt, 291 Minn. 105, 189 N.W.2d 701 (1971); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co.,
288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265
Minn. 503, 122 N.W.2d 178 (1963).
96. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subds. 2(c)-(d) (1974). See notes 101-28 infra and accompanying
text.
97. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subd. 2(a) (1974). See notes 129-33 infra and accompanying text.
98. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subd. 2(b) (1974). See notes 129-33 infra and accompanying text.
99. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subd. 2(e) (1974), as amended, Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 193, § 1,
[1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 657. See notes 134-36 infra and accompanying text.
100. MINN. STAT. §§ 299B.03 subd. 2(f), .04(2) (1974). See notes 137-46 infra and accompanying text.
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1.Eligible Claimants
The Act provides for recovery by four classes of persons: the victim, his
dependents, his estate, and those who have furnished him with certain defined
medical products, services, or accommodations."0 ' In addition, the Act
automatically excludes a class of otherwise eligible claimants from receiving
compensation. This class consists of the offender, the offender's spouse,
children, parents, brother and sister, members of his household, and any
0 2
person whose receipt of an award would unjustly benefit the offender.
Perhaps the greatest difficulties with these eligibility requirements will be
encountered in defining those who qualify as dependents of the victim and
in dealing with claims of those who are excluded from recovery.
a. Dependents
A "dependent" is defined by the Act as "any person who was dependent
upon a deceased victim for support at the time of the crime."' 03 Unlike the
Uniform Act and acts of other states which define dependent as one wholly or
partially dependent on the deceased for support or care,' 4 the Act is silent as
to the degree of dependency required for eligibility. The absence of similar
language in the Minnesota Act, especially in light of the consideration given
the other acts during the drafting stages, 05 could lead to a construction which
would allow only persons wholly dependent on the victim to recover. This
interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of
the Act.' Moreover, interpretation of "dependent" by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in the analogous contexts of insurance and workers' com-

101. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subds. l(a)-(d) (Supp. 1975). In addition, the Act also provides a
derivative method of recovery for guardians, conservators, and agents of any of those persons
comprising the four main classes. Id. § 299B.03, subd. I(e).
102. Id. § 299B.03, subds. 2(c)-(d) (1974). The Act provides, however, that the offender's
spouse, children, parents, brother and sister, and members of his household may recover where
the "interests ofjustice otherwise require." Id. § 299B.03, subd. 2(c).
103. Id. § 299B.02(6).
104. The Uniform Act defines "dependent" to mean "a natural person wholly or partially
dependent upon the victim for care or support ...." UNIFORM CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS
ACT § l(f). Both New Jersey and Hawaii, while permitting a dependent who is either wholly or
partially dependent on the victim at the time of his death to recover, limit application of this
provision to relatives. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-2 (Supp. 1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-2
(1968). Massachusetts restricts classification as a dependent to an enumerated list of relatives,
and imposes a further requirement that the relative be living with the victim at the time of his
injury or death. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § I (Supp. 1976).
105. See, e.g., Tape of Meeting on S.F. 884 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaw & Corrections of the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 9, 1973); Tape ofJoint Meeting
on S.F. 884 Before the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Minnesota House
Comm. on Crime Prevention & Corrections(Nov. 13, 1973).
106. The legislature intended to compensate victims of crimes and to relieve hardships that
result from such crimes, a purpose which the Minnesota court has recognized as remedial.
Cf, e.g., State ex rel. Duluth Brewing & Malting Co. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 176, 178, 151
N.W.91 2, 913 (1915) (workers' compensation).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol2/iss1/5

16

et al.: The Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act: A Preliminary Analys
THE MINNESO TA CRIME VICTIMS REPA RA TIONS A CT

pensation has merely required regular and expected reliance of some degree
on the capacities of the injured party. 07 Drawing from these definitions of
dependency, a reasonable test to apply under the Act seems to be whether the
claimant regularly' relied on contributions from the deceased for some form
of support in the past. 09 Actual dependency is controlling rather than the
degree of the dependency.
Specification of the date of the crime, rather than the date of death, for
purposes of determining dependency has the advantage of not overburdening
the Board by requiring time-consuming and expensive investigations into the
genuineness of the dependency, because parties would have no opportunity to
"arrange" their relationship in order to qualify for reparations. Use of the
date of the crime in determining dependency has the further effect of
excluding from recovery children of the victim conceived after the date of the
crime, because in no sense can a child not yet conceived rely on the capacities
of the victim. The question, however, whether a child conceived before the
date of the crime and born after that date is also excluded remains.
(1) "Post-crime" Children
The Act properly does not deal with the issue of whether a posthumous
child can recover, because those acts which do make specific provision for
107. The support need not be total. Meyers v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 134 F.2d 457, 45859 (10th Cir. 1943); Wells-Dickey Trust Co. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 166 Minn. 79, 82-83, 207
N.W. 186, 187 (1926), rev'd on other grounds, 275 U.S. 161 (1927). Nor must the person be
unable to support himself, provided the support received is actual. Ketchikan Lumber & Shingle
Co. v. Bishop, 24 F.2d 63, 63 (9th Cir. 1928); Wells-Dickey Trust Co. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R.,
supra at 82-83, 207 N.W. at 187. Moreover, no legal obligation to support the claimant need be
established. See Langland v. State Dep't of Highways, 250 Minn. 544, 85 N.W.2d 736 (1957)
(by implication). However the degree to which the claimant relied on the regular contributions of
the deceased is a factor. See Bartkey v. Sanitary Farm Dairies, 170 Minn. 159, 212 N.W. 175
(1927).
108. Assistance which is prompted by nothing more than impulse or generosity of the victim
lacks the necessary element of regularity. See Blocker v. Most Worshipful Grand Lodge, 132
S.W.2d 1088, 1090 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939). Furthermore, a requirement of regularity eliminates
the possibility of recovery by a person who temporarily happened to be receiving support from
the deceased on the date of the crime.
109. Once dependency is established one of the factors the Board will have to consider in each
case to determine the amount of recovery to be awarded for loss of support is whether, on the
date of the crime, the claimant had a reasonable basis for expecting continued contributions
from the victim had he lived. For example, the fact that the deceased's spouse filed for dissolution prior to the date of the crime would act to reduce the spouse's recovery for loss of support.
Recovery should be allowed only for the provable loss up to the time dependency would have
terminated naturally. Similar results would be obtained where claims are made by a dependent
who will soon be married, emancipated, or otherwise financially self-supporting. If consideration
were not given to an anticipated change in the status of a claimant, the only means of assuring
that a claimant will not benefit by the victim's death would be to make frequent and costly reevaluations of the claimant's status. Should the foreseeable change in the claimant's status not
occur, he has the right to reopen the proceedings to consider the amount of the award. MINN.
STAT. § 299B.06, subd. 2(h) (1974).
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posthumous children require dependency on the date of the victim's death. " '
Where the date of the crime is the determinative date, the proper inquiry is
whether a child conceived before the date of the crime and born after-the
"post-crime" child-can recover. It is assumed that from the date of conception a fetus is "dependent" on the deceased in that it receives and relies on
regular support contributions from him in the form of prenatal care. The
only issue that needs to be resolved, therefore, in determining the eligibility of
a "post-crime" child is whether the child is a "person" on the date of the
crime. The term "person" is not defined in the Act and thus gives rise to
questions regarding the viability of the fetus'' and whether the "dependent"
need have a separate and independent existence from the mother on the date
of the crime."I It is unlikely, however, that the authors intended the Board to
become involved in the resolution of these time-consuming questions, because
that would greatly increase the administrative costs the legislature was so
concerned about keeping at a minimum. The only reasonable conclusion
that can be made is that the legislature intended that those not yet born on the
date of the crime not be eligible to recover under the Act.
(2) Illegitimate Children
The Minnesota statute makes no specific reference to the ability of an
illegitimate child to recover. The language of the statute, however, seems to
indicate that the legal status of the child would be irrelevant as long as the
child can show it meets the requirements of the dependency test.113 This view
might be mandated in light of a recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court that for the purposes of recovery under workers' compensation laws
an illegitimate child cannot be denied recovery which it could otherwise
obtain as a legitimate child without violating the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment."' Thus, whatever the legal status of the child, it
can nevertheless be a dependent, and would therefore be covered by the provisions of the Act.
110. The UNIFORM CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT § l(f), as well as several state statutes,
see ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.180(2) (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-2 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:4B-2 (Supp. 1975), specifically allow a child born after the death of the victim to recover.
I ll. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a cause of action will lie for the wrongful
death of an unborn viable child. See Pehrson v. Kistner, - Minn. __,
222 N.W.2d 334
(1974).
112. Other jurisdictions have held that a fetus which has reached a period of prenatal maturity
where it is capable of independent life apart from the mother is a "person" for the purposes of
bringing an action for injuries suffered during its viability, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 55, at 336-37 (4th ed. 1971), and that the parents of a child injured while viable who
dies after birth from those injuries may bring an action for wrongful death. See, e.g., Peterson v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 551, 197 N.E.2d 194 (1964).
113. See MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(6) (1974).
114. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). The Court said that an illegitimate unacknowledged child could suffer as much as an acknowledged child or one born in
wedlock, citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (statute barring an illegitimate unacknowledged child from recovering for mother's wrongful death is a denial of equal protection).
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b. Estate of Deceased
15
The estate of the deceased is also eligible to file a claim for reparations.
The losses which the estate normally would incur are for services rendered
to the victim for which it is liable after his death, as well as for funeral
expenses.
c. Other Persons
"Any other person" who has incurred economic loss by purchasing products, services, or accommodations for a victim is also eligible for compensation."' The statutory term "any other person" would appear to refer to
friends or non-dependent parents or children who paid for services or products necessary for the treatment of the victim." 7 While a creditor, such as a
hospital or druggist, clearly will have incurred a loss for goods and services
provided, the creditor has not "purchased" anything in the normal sense of
the word. Therefore, creditors cannot apply directly for program benefits,
although they can receive compensation directly from the Board after a
victim, dependent, the estate of the deceased, or any other qualified person
has been granted an award. "'
115. MINN. STAT. §299 B.03, subd. I(c) (Supp. 1975).
116. Id. § 299B.03, subd. 1(d).
117. The original wording of the statute was "any other person who has incurred economic
loss by purchasing any of the products, services, and accommodations described in section
[299B.02], clauses (a)(i) and (a)(ii) for a victim." Act of Apr. 1I,1974, ch. 463, § 3, [1974] Minn.
Sess. Laws 1135. The quoted clause "(a)" refers to loss in the case of an injury as distinguished
from loss in the case of death. Compensation for the latter loss is dealt with in clause "(b)" of
MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(7) (1974). Thus, it was arguable that the original Act provided compensation to "others" only in the event the victim did not ultimately die from his injuries. This
result is discriminatory and illogical. While it was possible to construe the limitations of the
original Act as allowing reimbursement of "other persons" only for expenses resulting from
injury before death and not those expenses resulting from death, this intent was by no means
clear. In 1975 this doubt was removed when the provision was amended to include losses
incurred by others whether or not the victim subsequently died from his injury. Act of June 2,
1975, ch. 246, § 1,[1975] Minn. Sess. Laws 698. In 1976, however, a revisor's bill changed the
limitation back to its original form. Act of Feb. 2, 1976, ch. 2, § 119, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 13.
The change was made without the knowledge of any members of the Board or of the Executive
Director. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims
Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Sept. 1, 1976. Nevertheless, the Board
intends to read § 299B.03, subd. l(d) as it did after the 1975 amendment. Letter from Samuel L.
Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William
Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976. Undoubtedly, the 1976 change was the result of a technical
mistake and should be removed at the earliest possible opportunity. Should this not be the case,
however, the compensability of losses incurred by an "other person" in the event of the victim's
death is again placed in doubt. To avoid an absurd or unreasonable construction, this doubt
should be resolved by allowing in all instances reimbursement of "other persons" for "economic
loss" incurred as a result of the victim's injury but precluding in all instances any recovery for
losses incurred as a result of death, i.e., without consideration of whether the victim ultimately
dies from the injury. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(l) (1974).
118. Since economic loss, by definition, is not limited to out-of-pocket loss, see MINN. STAT.
§ 299B.02(7) (1974), a debt due and owing to a creditor for services rendered is within the range
of losses for which eligible claimants could apply for recovery.
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d. Persons Excludedfrom Recovery
The offender's spouse, children, parents and siblings, and members of his
household are automatically excluded from compensation under the Act,
unless the "interests of justice" require otherwise.11 9 This class exclusion
attempts to avert collusion between the offender and the claimant and to
prevent any benefit or advantage from flowing to the offender as a result of
his criminal conduct. 120 Yet strict enforcement of the other provisions of the
Act seems to be more than adequate in accomplishing these purposes."'
While it certainly cannot be argued that the exclusionary provisions are
intrinsically unreasonable, an automatic or strict application of them would
result in inequities.
The exclusion of the offender's family operates from the presumption that
victims who are members of the offender's family, merely by virtue of that
relationship, are either partially responsible for the crime, or likely to conFurthermore, it has been suggested that the
spire to fabricate a claim.'
prospect of compensation might induce family members to injure one
another.2
Use of the statutory "presumption," however, would exclude in many
instances a large percentage' of those persons whom the program allegedly
119. Id. § 299B.03, subd. 2(c). In addition, the offender and any persons whose receipt of an
award would unjustly benefit the offender are completely excluded from recovery. Id. § 299B.03,
subd. 2(d).
120. Yarborough, The Battle for a Federal Violent Crimes Compensation Act: The Genesis
of S. 9, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 93, 104 (1970). One situation where the offender might "benefit from"
his crime is when the offender simply appropriates to his own purposes the award made to a
family member. Since the stronger family member often attacks the weaker member, the victim
member, the victim may be unable or unwilling to prevent usurpation by the offender. However, where in the Board's estimation this appears to be a strong possibility, it could exercise its
discretionary power to pay the reparations directly to the suppliers. MINN. STAT. § 299B.09
(1974).
121. For instance, one deterrent to fraud is the criminal sanction under the Act for filing a
false claim. See MINN. STAT. § 299B.16 (1974). The Act also provides that an award may be
reduced to the extent deemed reasonable in light of a claimant's contributory misconduct.
See id. § 299B.03 subd. 2(d), .04(2) (1974). Furthermore, it is unlikely that many claimants will
attempt to defraud the Board, since they cannot recover an amount greater than their actual
provable expenses. See id. § 299B.07, subd. 3 (1974). When coupled with the Board's discretionary power to pay benefits directly to suppliers of medical products, services, or accommodations,
id. § 299B.09 (1974), strict enforcement of these other provisions obviates the need for a class
exclusion.
122. See Yarborough, supra note 120, at 104. But see Lamborn, The Scope of Programsfor
GovernmentalCompensation of Victims of Crime, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 21, 85.
123. The deterrent effect of denying recovery is questionable. If a potential criminal is not
deterred by affection or fear of prosecution, it is unlikely that denial of recovery to the family
member will diminish the criminal propensity. Lamborn, supra note 122, at 85.
124. Percentage of victims who are members of the criminal's family:
criminal homicide:
aggravated assault:
forcible rape:
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was intended to cover, and the Board's power to act in the "interests of
justice" should therefore be invoked liberally. Actual and, in many cases,
severe injuries can be proved which would negate any suggestion that the
claim was collusive." 5 Furthermore, temptation of collusion between family
members is no lesser or greater than that which exists between friends. 2 6 One
can turn what in actuality is an accident into a crime of assault by a stranger
just as easily as one can turn it into a crime by a spouse.' 27 Also, this provision
has no deterrent effect in cases where a claimant states that he is unaware of
the identity of the offender, while having actual knowledge that the offender
was a member of the family. Finally, family members are not, in some
instances, in sufficiently close geographical or social proximity with one
another for the opportunity for collusion to exist. Automatic application of
the exclusion of an offender's estranged spouse, his adult children living
outside the household, or distant members of the offender's family would
often lead to harsh results.
Like family members, persons "living in the same household with" the
offender presumably are excluded because their continuous contact with the
offender is deemed to render them more susceptible to collusive overtures.
According to such reasoning, transients would be able to file a claim, whereas
those maintaining a residence with the offender for some substantial period
of time would be excluded. The exclusion, however, of non-family members
of the household of the offender may work the same hardships as does the
exclusion of family members. 2 Therefore, the Board should not hesitate to
invoke its power to serve the "interests of justice" where household members
file claims.
2. Reporting to and Cooperatingwith the Police
In order to be eligible for an award, an individual must report the crime
to the police within five days of its occurrence or of the time when the report
could reasonably have been made.2 9 The victim or claimant must also coop3
erate fully with the police in their investigation of the reported crime.1 0
These requirements aid law enforcement agencies in combating crime. In
addition, because the Board generally adopts the findings of the police as to
the issues of whether a crime actually occurred and whether the victim coop-

Lamborn, supra note 122, at 84-85, citing D.

MULIHILL

& M.

TUMIN, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

217(1969).
125. The majority of homicides are committed by relatives and friends of the victims. U.S.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 18, 19 (1974). For a further
statistical breakdown of types of violent crimes among family members, see U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 197 (1973).
126. Lamborn, supra note 122, at 85.
127. Id.
128. See Cosway, Crime Compensation, 49 WASH. L. REv. 551,562 (1974).
129. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subd. 2(a) (1974).
130. Id. § 299B.03, subd. 2(b).
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erated fully with the police, 3 ' these initial dealings with law enforcement
officials are crucial to a victim's or other claimdnt's recovery.
The five-day reporting period is arbitrary, but is more generous than provisions in the majority of other states.'32 This period appears to be more realistic, because it takes into account the majority of cases in which the delay is
justified and is a result of the crime itself, such as short periods of convalescence due to the crime-related injury and temporary incapacity due to the
initial emotional trauma of the crime. The reporting period requirement is
liberalized even further to allow the crime to be reported within five days of
33
the time when a report could reasonably have been made.
3. Statute of Limitations
A one-year statute of limitations is applicable to filing claims with the
Board. 34 The period begins to run at the date of the injury or death,, 5 rather
than the date of the crime. A recent amendment1 36 to the statute to allow a
claim to be filed "within one year of the time when a claim could have been
made" was prompted by a claim which arose from a kidnapping and murder
in August, 1974. The victim's body was not discovered until approximately
15 months later, at which time a claim was filed. The Board sought the
amendment, feeling a need for flexibility in order to avoid denying an otherwise qualifying claim for failure to comply with an arbitrary statutory
requirement.
The statute of limitations thus recognizes that an injury resulting from the
crime may not manifest itself for some time after the date of the crime. A
generous period of time is now provided within which the claimant can determine the extent of the injury- or death-related expenses incurred.

131. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims
Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976. The Board retains discretion, of course, to adopt its own findings where there appears to be bias on the part of the
police. Id.
132. Several states require the crime to be reported within 72 hours, with an extension for
good cause. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1813E (Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-06.4
(Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.060(2) (Supp. 1976). Other states are even more demanding and require the crime to be reported within 48 hours unless there is good cause. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12(a) (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 5 (Supp. 1976); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 631(l) (McKinney 1972). Illinois requires the crime to be reported as soon as
practicable. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 73(c) (Supp. 1976).
133. MINN. STAT. § 299B.03, subd. 2(a) (1974). Examples of situations which fall within this
exception are a more prolonged convalescence period or extended emotional trauma, a lost
camper who does not emerge from the woods before five days after the crime, a victim suffering
from amnesia, or the discovery of a murder weeks after its commission. .
134. See id. § 299B.03, subd. 2(e) (1974), as amended, Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 193, § I,
[1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 657.
135. Id.
136. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 193, § 1, [19761 Minn. Sess. Laws 657, to be codified as MINN.
STAT. § 299B.03, subd. 2(e).
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4. The Minimum Claim Requirement
To ease the Board's administrative, investigative, and economic burdens,
the Act disallows claims for less than $100 of economic loss.'37 The imposition of the minimum claim requirement is intended to serve two functions. As
do similar provisions in insurance policies,'38 it screens out a large number of
small claims which would create a clog in the administrative system. 39 The
requirement also preserves limited funds for those whose needs are greater
because of their more severe economic loss.
The requirement, however, does not avoid imposing a hardship. A reasonable assumption can be made that victims from middle and upper income
groups will either have collateral sources of recovery, 4 ' or be better able to
absorb losses of less than $100. Victims from lower income groups, however,
will suffer the brunt of the requirement. They form a disproportionate percentage of crime victims and are peculiarly unable to bear even small
losses."'
Whether the exclusionary floor accomplishes its purpose of economy can
be questioned. All claims which are filed must be considered,' 42 even if the
minimum amount of loss is not claimed. If denied, the claimant must be given
the reasons for denial in writing.' 3 Thus, arguably no added administrative
burden would result by allowing smaller claims.'" Moreover, the $100 mini137. See MINN. STAT. § 299B.04(2) (1974) ($100 deductible). In addition to the $100 deductible, the Act also has a separate provision requiring the claim to exceed $100. See id. § 299B.03,
subd. 2(f). The latter provision is redundant because the provision for deducting $100 from the
award has the same effect as requiring a compensable award to exceed $100.
138. One purpose of the minimum claim requirement in insurance is to minimize premium
rates by avoiding the costs of adjusting small claims. See A. MOWBRAY, INSURANCE 150 (6th
ed. 1969). See also C. KULP & J. HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE 45 (4th ed. 1968).
139. Lamborn,supra note 122, at 54.
140. See note 30supra.
141. Note, New York Crime Victims Compensation Board Act: Four Years Later, 7
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 25,41(1971).
142. MINN. STAT. § 299B.07, subds. 1-2 (1974) provide:
Subdivision I. A claim, when accepted for filing, shall be assigned by the chairman
to himself or to another member of the board.
Subd. 2. The board member to whom the claim is assigned shall examine the papers
filed in support of the claim and cause an investigation to be conducted into the
validity of the claim. (Emphasis added.)
Of course, many claims are never filed after a preliminary telephone inquiry to the Crime Victims Reparations Board because of obvious failure to meet a statutory requirement. Letter from
Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to
William Mitchell Law Review, Sept. 1, 1976.
143. MINN. STAT. § 299B.07, subd. 5 (1974).
144. Although the administrative burden of initial investigation is not affected by the $100
minimum, the denial of a claim on the basis of failure to satisfy the minimum reduces the
administrative task of any further investigation which would have been necessary to settle the
claim. Forty-seven claims were so denied during the period from July I, 1974, through June 30,
1976. Board Register, supra note 72, table IV. A possible alternative to the $100 minimum would
be a filing fee which would help to defray costs and eliminate the de minimis claims. Massachusetts, which administers the program through the courts, imposes such a fee by statute.
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mum ultimately may encourage inflated claims in order to recoup losses
actually suffered. 45 It may also promote collusion between claimants and
creditors seeking to guarantee payment for services, products, and accommodations rendered, which would actually increase the burdens on the
program."'
C. Compensable Crime
To be compensable, injury or death must be the direct result of either a
crime or an attempt to prevent a crime, or an attempt to apprehend a person
suspected of engaging in a crime.' 47 "Crime" is defined by the Act as conduct
which (I) may subject one to a sentence of imprisonment, regardless of the
offender's capacity to commit the crime, (2) poses a substantial threat of
personal injury or death, and (3) occurs or is attempted within the state. 4 '
Crimes involving motor vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft are specifically
excluded from this definition, except where the criminal conduct is intended
to cause injury or death, or the vehicle is used in the commission of a
felony." '
While other provisions relating to contributory misconduct,' 50 good faith,'5 '
and collateral source,' 2 have been enacted to safeguard against unjustifiable
disbursement of the Board's limited funds, the limitations imposed here,
along with the direct result requirement' 55 set the outside boundaries within
which an action must fall before a claim will be considered and before the
other provisions will be applied.
Two of the three parts of the Act's definition of "crime" are significant.
MASS. GEN.

LAWS ANN.

ch. 258A, § 4 (Supp. 1976). It still retains, however, both the $100

minimum and the $100 deductible. Id. ch. 258A, § 5.
145. The effect of the minimum requirement when combined with the $100 compulsory
deduction from the total award may in fact provide an inducement to fraud. See Note, supra
note 14 1, at 37-38: Floyd, Compensation to Victinis of Violent Crime, 6 TULSA L. REv. 100, 126
(1970). If the actual loss suffered is $105, the claimant may try to inflate his claim to $205 in
order to recoup his actual losses. Predictably, few people will take the time to file a legitimate
claim of S105 or $115 when they will be able to recover only $5 or $15. Thus the provision may
be a deterrent, but nonetheless it evidences a belief that minor losses are not as deserving of
compensation as larger ones.
146. This result may not occur, however, in light of the Board's discretion to make awards
directly to the suppliers of services. See MINN. STAT. § 299B.09 (1974).
147. Id. § 299B.02(9).
148. Id. § 299B.02(5)(a).
149. Id. § 299B.02(5)(c). This is a practical limitation on the scope of the program for several
reasons. First, a right to recover for wrongful death is permitted under Minnesota law. Id. §
573.02. Secondly, there is a substantial likelihood of insurance coverage where motor, water, or
air vehicles are involved. See id. § 65B.48 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1975) (insurance requirements under the no-fault act). Third, because more negligent acts are committed than intentional acts, cost economy requires negligence actions to be excluded.

150.

MINN. STAT.

§ 299B.04(2) (1974).

15 1. Id. § 299 B.02(9).
152. Id. § 299B.02(4).
153. See notes 156-66 infra and accompanying text.
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The first condition, in effect, requires the conduct to constitute at least a misdemeanor. However, a misdemeanor, or even a felony, is not a "crime"
within the meaning of the Act, unless it also satisfies the second requirement
of posing a, substantial threat of injury or death. This latter requirement does
not specify whether the crime must intrinsically pose a "substantial threat" of
personal injury or death, or whether a "substantial threat" should be determined in light of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime;
that is, whether the crime must be dangerous by definition or dangerous as
carried out. For example, burglary consists of entering or remaining within a
building without the consent of the person in lawful possession or authority,
and with the intent to commit a crime therein. 154 By definition, burglary is
non-violent with respect to persons and is seemingly unattended by a substantial threat of personal injury or death. But it can be contended that where
the occupant of a building is surprised by a burglar the burglary poses a
"substantial threat" of personal injury. In this example, if the "substantial
threat" must be intrinsic to the statutory offense, burglary is not a compensable crime, thus precluding the victim who suffers nervous shock from
reparation benefits. For several reasons, a view which considers the particular
circumstances of each crime is preferable.
First, "substantial threat" in the statutory definition modifies "conduct."
Thus, "crime" is conduct which under the Act, inter alia, poses a substantial threat of personal injury or death. Second, if compensable "crime" were
limited only to conduct which intrinsically poses a threat of injury or death,
the "good Samaritan" provision of the Act would be emasculated. For
example, one who attempted to prevent a burglary of another's home could
not recover because a burglary is not, by definition, dangerous. But one who
attempted to prevent an assault could recover. If "substantial threat" were
differentiated on the basis of the intrinsic nature of the particular "crime"
involved, it would exclude a well-intentioned good Samaritan without serving
any important public purpose. Finally, whichever view of the "substantial
threat" requirement is adopted, the Board still must determine whether the
threat of injury or death was "substantial" or not. If the inherent nature of
the crime viewpoint were adopted, then the Board would have to categorize
each crime according to whether its inherent nature posed a "substantial
threat" or not. If, however, the "circumstantial threat" theory were adopted,
then all the circumstances of the conduct would be considered. Had the legislature intended the former view, it could have incorporated a list of crimes
which pose a "substantial threat" into the Act. Because it did not include
such a list, the negative implication is that the creation of a rigid enumeration
of crimes which pose a "substantial threat" was not intended. In balance, the
most equitable and logical approach appears to be the "circumstantial
threat" theory. 155
154. MiNN. STAT. § 609.58, subd. 2 (1974).
155. This is, in fact, the view that has been adopted by the Board. Letter from Samuel L.
Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William
Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976.
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D. "Direct Result"
The Act specifies that an injury or death must be the "direct result" of a
crime, an effort to prevent a crime, or an effort to apprehend a person suspected of engaging in a crime in order to be compensable. 516 Unfortunately,
the Act does not define "direct result." Thus, the Board's task in establishing
the exact perimeters of the term is not an easy one. Whatever standard the
Board uses, it must deal with two problems. The first is causation in fact. The
second is "the ultimate limits" under the Act.
Causation in fact is the easier of the two issues to resolve. It would be
logically improvident to find an individual a "victim" unless a crime was at
least a sine qua non of his injury. The critical problem, however, is concurrent
causes. For example, if two causes (one criminal and one non-criminal)
concur to bring about an injury, and if either is sufficient to bring about the
injury, then, strictly speaking, neither act is the "but for" of the injury. Thus,
1 57
it might be argued the crime was not a cause in fact of the injury.
If the traditional tort law approach in Minnesota is used in determining
"direct result," the criminal act need be only a "material and substantial
factor" in bringing about the result. 58 In the vast majority of instances, this
"material and substantial factor" test would, in effect, only reapply the "but
for" test. In the special instance of concurrent causes, however, it offers a
workable, common sense rule. In the absence of a compelling reason to
believe that the legislature intended a different rule of intended causation,
this test should apply to the Act.
After causation in fact, the second problem which must be confronted in
determining the meaning of "direct result" is whether the results are too
remote in time or place to justify recovery, even though they were caused in
fact by the crime. In other words, when do injuries caused "in fact" by a
crime cease to be the "direct result" of a crime? At such a point the person
receiving the injuries ceases to be classified as a "victim" under the Act.
Otherwise the ills of society would be covered. The all-important question is
where the line is drawn.
Because the Act provides no definition of "direct result," the approach the
Board should take may be determined by the theoretical perspective from
which the Act is to be viewed. If the Act is seen as a program for indemnify156. See MINN.

STAT.

§ 299B.02(9) (1974).

157. Cf W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 239-41 (4th ed. 1971).

158. This test was first adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the landmark decision of
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920), affdon
other grounds, 150 Minn. 530, 185 N.W. 299 (1921). Although the Minnesota court attempted
to adopt the "substantial factor" test as a test not only of causation, but also of the "proximate"
cause, see Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 363-65, 256 N.W. 901, 903-04 (1934), it later
rejected such an approach, see Seward v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 222 Minn. 454, 457-59, 25
N.W.2d 221, 223-24 (1946).
The test has been consistently followed in other jurisdictions as well. W. PROSSER, supra note
157, § 41,at 240 & n.27.
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ing citizens for the negligence or quasi-negligence of the state, then to think
in terms of "negligence" may be appropriate.
If the "negligence" approach is adopted, "direct result" is likely to be
interpreted in terms of "proximate cause." This interpretation would provide
a familiar standard and a well-settled body of rules. Although appealing,
equating "direct result" with "proximate cause" creates problems, because
the term "proximate cause" is used in a preceding part of the Act.' 9 This
suggests that "direct result" is not meant to be equated with "proximate
cause." If the legislature had so intended, it would have used that term. In
rebuttal, it might be argued that the choice of the term "direct result" by the
legislature does not preclude the use of a proximate cause test because the
word "direct" only modifies "result" and strictly speaking does not refer to
a "cause." In other words, the term "direct result" appears to center on the
injury while "proximate cause" seems to center on the wrongful act, and thus
it might be argued that the tests are not necessarily inconsistent but only
point to different ends of the same chain of causation. Nonetheless, the
nonuse of "proximate cause" appears significant.
A second, more restrictive interpretation of "direct result" is also possible
under the "negligence" approach. When the legislature uses a term which
carries a special meaning, it is presumed to have intended to use it in the sense
in which it has been approved and recognized by court decisions. 160 While
some early Minnesota negligence decisions use the term "direct" in a general
sense as equivalent to "proximate,"'"' the term "direct" is not without a
special meaning in tort law. In an early and exhaustive study of the meaning
of causation as it had been interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court,
Professor Prosser indicated that the term "direct" in tort law is used to
describe a causal connection without the intervention of external forces
between conduct and injury.' 2 Intervening cause1 3 is eliminated. 6'
159. See MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(5)(c)(ii) (1974).
160. State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 160-61,21 N.W.2d 480, 486 (1946), construing MINN.
STAT. § 645.08(l) (1974).
161. See Hamilton v. Vare, 184 Minn. 580, 583, 239 N.W. 659, 660 (1931); McLean v. Burbank, II Minn. 277, 290 (Gil. 189, 199) (1865), affdon othergrounds, 12 Minn. 530 (Gil. 438)
(1867). See generally Bauer, Confusion of the Terms "Proximate" and "Direct", II NOTRE
DAME LAW. 395 (1936).
162. Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REV. 19, 27 n.37
(1936) states:
[i]t is used to indicate a causal connection in which no active forces of external origin
intervene between the defendant's conduct and the result. An analogy might be suggested to knocking over the first row of blocks, after which all the rest fall down without
the assistance of any other force .... Nothing intervened.
Accord, W. PROSSER, supra note 157, § 43, at 264. See generally id. at 263-67. See also Bauer,
supra note 161.
163. Intervening forces are those which come into operation after the initial act. They come
into active operation to change an already existing condition.
164. The operation of these two possible viewpoints can be illustrated as follows. Assume an
elderly person is attacked, stabbed, and remains in a weakened condition. Later, pneumonia
germs enter the victim's body and he dies. Was the victim's death a "direct result" of the crime?
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While the distinctions between the "proximate" and "direct" cause
approaches may be criticized as unduly technical, they do indicate the
scope of the problem. Until the Act is clarified, it is doubtful what tests
apply. The final solution may be that the Act, like workers' compensation, is
sui generis and thus deserving of special treatment. The legislature knew in
drafting the Act that the "direct result" requirement would be generally
applied by laymen. 65 The most realistic and workable approach, therefore,
may simply be to allow the Board to develop its own general standards on a
case-by-case basis. In the area of negligence, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has observed that "proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the
jury, to be solved by the exercise of good common sense in the consideration
of the evidence of each particular cause."' 161 Perhaps the same should be said
here of the task of the Board.
E. Injury
To come within the definition of "victim," a person must suffer an "injury," which is defined as "actual bodily harm." The definition, however,
'
includes "pregnancy and mental or nervous shock."167
1. Pregnancy
The inclusion of pregnancy within the definition of "injury" apparently
was intended to provide coverage to the rape' victim. A woman who becomes pregnant as the result of a rape will need to be treated for the resulting
physical and psychological problems of pregnancy. She can be reimbursed
under the Act for all "actual economic detriment incurred as a direct result
of injury or death." Thus, an individual whose injury is pregnancy can
recover the "reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical [or] hospital
...products, services, or accommodations,""9' ' as well as for necessary psychological and psychiatric services, 70 and for loss of income the victim would
If "direct result" is equal to "proximate cause," the victim is covered by the Act. Cf Anderson
v.Anderson, 188 Minn. 602, 248 N.W. 35 (1933) (auto accident weakened woman; death 52 days
later from pneumonia). On the other hand, if "direct result" means "direct" he could not
recover since the subsequent contraction of the pneumonia germs is an intervening force. They
were not present at the time of the attack. Cf State v. James, 123 Minn. 487, 144 N.W. 216
(1913) (by implication) (murder; pneumonia germs entered victim's lungs on blade of knife
used in attack; no intervening force).
165. Only one of the three Board members must be an attorney. See MINN. STAT. §299B.05,
subd. 1(1974).
166. Healy v. Hoy, 115 Minn. 321, 323, 132 N.W. 208, 209 (1911).
167. MINN. STAT. §299B.02(8) (1974).
168. Rape, as such, no longer exists as a separate offense under Minnesota law. In 1975, the
Minnesota legislature replaced the existing rape, sodomy, and indecent liberties statutes with a
single statute specifying degrees of criminal sexual conduct. Compare Act of May 17, 1967, ch.
507, § 2-3, [1967] Minn. Sess. Laws 1047-48 (repealed 1975) with MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342-.345
(Supp. 1975), as amended, Act of Apr. 2, 1976, ch. 124. § 9, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 284-85.
169. MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(7)(a)(i) (1974).
170. Id. § 299 B.02(7)(a)(ii).
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have earned had she not been injured.'
The major problem created by the coverage of pregnancy under the Act is
in defining what are the "necessary" expenses arising therefrom. Construing
the term in light of its subject, context, and intended purpose,' "necessary"
expenses are those which would restore the rape victim to her former physical
and psychological status. Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that if a rape victim
chooses to carry the pregnancy to term, the medical and related expenses and
losses incurred during the prenatal, delivery, and post-partum periods of
pregnancy are necessary in the achievement of this physical and mental
restoration. The same analysis is applicable to expenses incurred as the result
of a victim's exercise of her fundamental right to terminate the pregnancy by
having an abortion.'73 Again, these expenses are necessary for the victim's
mental and physical rehabilitation. Furthermore, income losses incurred by
the victim during the prenatal, delivery, and post-partum periods of the pregnancy where it is carried to term, or incurred by a victim through the postabortion recovery period should similarly be covered. Subsequent income
losses, such as those arising from being required to remain at home to care
for the child, are probably covered, because the Act allows such compensation which "the victim would have earned had [s]he not been injured."' 74 Had

171. Id. § 299B.02(7)(a)(iii).
172. This approach was employed by Chief Justice Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) when construing the term "necessary" in the context of the "necessary and proper" clause of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Court rejected the contention that
necessary meant absolutely and indispensably necessary because that construction would exclude
the choice of means and restrict Congress to the most direct and simple method, thereby
emasculating the powers created by the Constitution. Rather, the Court construed necessary as
convenient, useful, or essential. 17 U.S. at 414-19. The intended purpose of the Minnesota
Crime Victims Reparations Act is humanitarian and thus the term should be construed in that
context. Therefore, by analogy, the expenses for necessary medical, psychological, and psychiatric services covered by the Act would be those useful and essential to treatment of the rape
victim, and not restricted to indispensable treatment.
173. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The coverage provisions of the Act do not constitute an invasion of the rape victim's fundamental right to decide whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy by obtaining an abortion. Since a victim is compensated for actual losses for medical
treatment, there is no benefit to be gained by having the child, and thus no interference with
the mother's decision regarding an abortion. It is debatable whether there is an incentive to
the mother to have the child because the Act allows recovery for loss of income. However,
because of the $10,000 limitation on recovery, the mother would exhaust most of even a maximum award by the time the child is born. When the $10,000 is finally exhausted, the full burden
for supporting the child would be on the mother. It is possible someone would have a child so she
could obtain welfare payments, yet it is improbable that all these remote considerations could
constitute state interference so as to render the coverage provisions of the Act unconstitutional.
Rather, the question presented by the Act is whether the victim, once having made the decision
to obtain an abortion, has the right to seek compensation from the Board for those abortionrelated expenses.
174. MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(7)(a)(iii) (1974). No claim for loss of income under these circumstances has been filed to date. However, the Executive Director has indicated the Board would
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the victim not been pregnant she would have had no child for which to care
and thus no loss of income, as there would have been no need to remain at
home.
2. Mental or Nervous Shock
Minnesota joins only six other states 75 in expressly allowing compensation
for expenses incurred in treating mental or nervous shock.1 76 Under the Minnesota Act, a claimant may recover for economic loss, which is defined as
actual economic detriment incurred as a direct result of injury. "Injury" is
defined as "actual bodily harm" which "includes mental or nervous shock."
The Act includes within the definition of "economic loss" "reasonable expenses incurred for psychological or psychiatric products, services or accommodations where the nature of the injury or the circumstances of the crime
77
are such that the treatment is necessary to the rehabilitation of the victim."'
While "mental or nervous shock" lacks a statutory definition,'78 the inclusion of the phrase within the definition of "actual bodily harm" might at first
glance appear to establish a requirement that any mental injury must be
accompanied by a physical manifestation of the injury, such as vomiting or
insomnia. This construction would be compatible with the tort law concept in
some jurisdictions where courts, distrustful of the validity of claims for
mental injury, condition recovery on the showing of a physical manifestation. 79 A more careful analysis of the language of the definition, however,
shows that mental or nervous shock is merely included within the definition of

probably grant a claim for loss of income. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director
of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Sept. 1,1976.
175. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 9002(7) (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-2 (1968);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1802(7) (West Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-2 (Supp. 1976);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-2(4) (Supp. 1975); Act of June 6, 1976, ch. 344, [1976] Wis. Legis.
Serv. 1619 (West), to be codified as Wis. STAT. §949.01(4).
176. Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Washington require bodily injury. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §
217.050 (1975); Act of June 6, 1976, act 139, [1976] Pa. Legis. Serv. 274 (West), to be codified as
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.020(3) (Supp. 1976). Four states
limit the definition of victim to persons who suffer a physical injury. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §
13960(a)(1) (West Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 2(e) (1973); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 621(5)
(McKinney 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.2 (Supp. 1976). Massachusetts provides for compensation "for medical care or other services necessary as a result of the injury" but states "[n]o
compensation shall be paid unless ... such crime directly resulted in personal physical injury."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 5 (Supp. 1976). Two states empower their boards to order
compensation for personal injury actually and reasonably incurred. See ALASKA STAT. §
18.67.110(1) (1974); GA. CODE § 47-523(l) (1974). And one of those states further compensates
for "any other loss ... which the board determines to be reasonable." ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.110(4)
(1974). North Dakota defines victim as "a person who suffers a personal injury," and includes a
section regarding the evidence required when the claimant's mental or emotional condition is in
issue. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-13-03(6)(g), -10 (Supp. 1975).
177. MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(7)(a)(ii) (1974).
178. Likewise, the six states which expressly allow compensation for mental or nervous
shock fail to define the term. See statutes cited note 175 supra.
179. W. PROSSER, supra note 157, § 54.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol2/iss1/5

30

et al.: The Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act: A Preliminary Analys
19761

THE MINNESOTA CRIME VICTIMS REPA RA TIONS A CT

"actual bodily harm," the language of inclusion thus expressly incorporating
an injury within the meaning of actual bodily harm which has traditionally
not been so conceptualized. The better view, therefore, is that no physical
manifestation of mental or nervous shock is necessary.'
While the term "mental or nervous shock" is susceptible of varying constructions ranging from minor emotional disturbances to more severe prolems, such as acute psychoses,' 8' which require institutionalization, the
policies and other language of the Act provide a more definite meaning. The
Act attempts to put an eligible claimant as nearly as possible in the same
economic condition he was in prior to the occurrence of the crime. That the
Act attempts to do this with respect to the victim's physical aspects is beyond
question, because the Act provides reimbursement for reasonable expenses
for necessary medical, chiropractic, and dental products and services, including "drugs, appliances and prosthetic devices."'8 s By including "mental or
nervous shock" within the definition of injury, the Act also appears to attempt
to return the victim to his prior state of mental well-being. Thus, the phrase
"mental or nervous shock" should be viewed as a legislative renunciation of
the distinction in the way of treating bodily and mental injuries and as an
expression of a policy that both types of injury are to be accorded recovery.
The limits of recovery for any type of mental injury are then to be established by the provisions permitting recovery for reasonable expenses incurred
for psychological or psychiatric products and services which are necessary for
the victim's rehabilitation. Because this provision parallels the language permitting recovery for medical expenses for bodily injury, the same factors
used by the Board in considering what is "reasonable" and "necessary" for
the treatment of bodily injury should be equally applicable to recovery for
mental injury-related expenses. Because the state of the science for the treatment of mental injury is not as precise as that for the treatment of bodily
injury, the Board should perhaps be more flexible in the determination of
whether a psychological or psychiatric treatment is "necessary" than it would
180. This recognizes that psychological injuries may involve as much actual harm as physical
injuries. Prosser points out that fright, shock, grief, anxiety, rage, and shame are recognized by
medical science to be physical injuries in the sense that they "produce well marked changes in the
body, and symptoms that are readily visible to the professional eye." W. PROSSER, supra note
157, § 12, at 50-51. See also 5 HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMM'N, ANN.
REP. case No. 72-58 (1972) (medical expenses resulting from emotional tension and shock
awarded to child who assisted police in apprehending a criminal). For a discussion of the
physical repercussions from unreleased emotional disturbances, see Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 496 (1922).
181. In M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW § 6a., at 19 (1973) the
author describes psychoses as:
profound, sweeping mental disorders characterized by partial or total loss of contact
with, or distortion of reality; severe disturbances of perception, thought processes,
feelings and behavior; retreat from or perversion of social relationships; and often a
disintegration of personality structure, leading to the release of processes which
ordinarily operate only unconsciously.
182. MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(7)(a)(i) (1974).
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had the injury been bodily in nature.
Other problems arise where the expenses incurred for psychological and
psychiatric care are due to the aggravation of a preexisting physical or mental
illness. What must be determined is whether the expenses would have been
incurred even had the injury not occurred. If the victim had sought treatment
for a similar condition prior to the incident, there is good reason for the
Board to prorate any expenses. On the other hand, if the victim never incurred
expenses prior to the crime for a similar condition, he should be awarded full
compensation for his losses. In aid of this determination, the Board may
require a mental or physical examination 153 and may obtain physicians' and
psychiatrists' reports regarding prior treatment.14
F. Coverage
The Act provides for the reimbursement of "reasonable expenses incurred
for necessary medical, chiropractic, hospital, , . . and dental products, services, or accommodations," as well as for lost income.18 This is typical of the
basic coverage provisions of the acts of other states.' The Minnesota Act is
also similar to acts of other states in containing no provision for recovery of
property loss incurred as a result of a crime. Beyond these basic provisions,
the extent of coverage varies among the states. The Minnesota Act, in extending coverage to expenses incurred for rehabilitative services, reflects an
awareness that recovery for medical and hospital expenses and for lost income
is inadequate to compensate a victim for losses resulting from a crime.
1.RehabilitativeServices
The Act provides recovery for reasonable expenses incurred for necessary
rehabilitative products, services, or accommodations.8 7 The tools of rehabilitation, physical medicine and psychiatry, are used to achieve the goal of
restoring "the handicapped to the fullest physical, mental, social, vocational
and economic usefulness of which they are capable."'' 88 The Minnesota Act

Id. § 299B.06, subd. 2(d).
Id. § 299B.06, subd. 2(a).
Id. §§ 299B.02(7)(a)(i), .02(7)(a)(iii), .02(7)(b)(ii).
See ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.110 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1975); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 13960(2)(d) (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 9002(8) (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE
§47-523 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. §351-33 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §74 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1802(8) (West Supp. 1976); MD.ANN. CODE art. 26A,
§ 12(b) (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 5 (Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT.
§217.200 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:4B-12 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(2) (McKinney
1972); N.D. CENT.CODE §§ 65-13-03(6)(a) to () (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN.LAWS ANN. § 12-25-2(7)
(Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.070-.080 (Supp. 1976); Act of June 6, 1976, ch.
344, § 3, [1976] Wis. Legis. Serv. 1620-21 (West), to be codified as WIs. STAT. §946.06.
187. MINN.STAT.§§ 299B.02(7)(a)(i), .02(7)(b)(ii) (1974).
188. Marryott & Cook, Rehabilitation of Claimants in Tort Cases, 29 INS. COUNSEL
J. 231, 231 (1962), quoting the National Council on Rehabilitation. See generally K. BROWN,
MEDICAL PROBLEMS AND THE LAW 153-65 (1971).
183.
184.
185.
186.
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thus recognizes that although compensation for medical expenses may help
"put the pieces" back together, in many cases it falls short of returning the
victim as nearly as possible to his prior productive capacity.
While the Act fails to define "rehabilitative services," it contains no words
of limitation. The Act, therefore, should be interpreted to permit compensation for a wide range of services. I"9 Certainly, physical therapy is within the
meaning of the term. In addition, academic, business, and vocational training, as well as career and personal counseling, should be encompassed,'
because these services are aimed at preparing the victim for "the best possible
life compatible with his abilities and disabilities."'' The increased cost of
providing coverage for these expenses is far outweighed by the long-term
societal benefits: restoration of the victim's personal dignity and self-reliance
with a concomitant reduction in the potential burden on the taxpayer to
provide welfare benefits and other social services to the permanently
disabled.9 2
2. Property Damage
The Minnesota Act, like nearly all acts in other states, does not provide
coverage for the loss of property incurred as a result of crime.'93 Criminallyinflicted property damage in the United States is conservatively estimated to
be $4 billion per year, 9 ' an amount which is clearly beyond the existing capabilities of the states to compensate. 195 The restriction of payment of repara189. Had the legislature intended to limit the types of rehabilitative services, it could have used
limiting language similar to that of the no-fault statute, where the responsibility of a reparation
obligor is limited to the cost of treatment, training, and courses for rehabilitation which are
reasonable in relation to rehabilitative effects and likely to "contribute substantially to medical
or occupational rehabilitation." MINN. STAT. § 65B.45, subd. I(1974).
190. Congress has found these services are necessary for rehabilitation and has therefore included them in the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, tit. I, § 103(a), 29 U.S.C. § 723(a)
(Supp. V, 1975) for the purpose of preparing handicapped persons for gainful employment to the
extent of their capabilities, id. tit. 1,§ 100(a), 29 U.S.C. §720(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
19 1. K. BROWN, supra note 188, at 155.
192. Conley, A Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Vocational Rehabilitation Program,2 J. HUMAN
RESOURCES 226, 243-44 (1967).
193. Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and New Brunswick statutes and British and
Ontario practices allow compensation for damage to clothing, eyeglasses, dentures, and other
property on the person at the time of injury. Lamborn, The Scope of Programsfor Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 21, 25. Hawaii allows compensation up to a $10,000 limit to citizens who incur property damage in preventing the commission of
a crime, in apprehending criminals, or in assisting police to do so. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 351-51,
-52(4), -62 (1968). California has a similar statute compensating citizens up to a $5,000 limit.
CAL.GOV'T CODE §§ 13970, 13973, 29631 (West Supp. 1976).
194. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 44 (1967). In Minnesota in 1974
almost $16 million of stolen property was not recovered. See MINNESOTA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL
APPREHENSION, MINNESOTA CRIME INFORMATION 56(1974).

195. Samuels, Compensation for Criminal Injuries in Britain, 17 U.
23(1967).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1976

TORONTO

L.J. 20,

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 5
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

tions to claims arising out of crimes of violence against the person appears to
be due largely to both the enormous economic burden a provision allowing
recovery for property loss would impose and the commonly held belief that
crimes against the person are more serious than those involving only damage
to property.'96
This view fails to recognize that a property crime, such as arson, may cause
more serious and permanent injury to a person's earning capacity'97 than
would a temporary personal injury." The cost argument is mitigated somewhat by the fact that property damage is often covered by insurance, which
constitutes a "collateral source" under the Act, which would therefore bar
recovery from state funds for that amount. Furthermore, over one-third of
the value of stolen property is recovered by the police.'99 Finally, coverage
under the Act would enable victims who are unable to afford private insurance to recover for losses which to them are very substantial. 00
On the other hand, property damage coverage would increase the filing of
fraudulent claims, because it is probable that more people would destroy
property than injure themselves in order to obtain compensation.2 ,' In addition, the temptation to exaggerate the amount of actual damage or to
attribute any kind of property damage to a criminal act would be greater if
coverage were allowed. 0 2 The costs of administering the reparations program
would increase due to the time-consuming investigations which would be
necessary to discern possible fraud. Mainly for the reason of increased cost,
it is likely that the citizens and legislators of Minnesota will be content to
limit reparations to personal injury losses20 3 and to defer to private sources
for coverage of property losses resulting from crimes.
3. Limitations on Recovery
Several significant provisions in the Act limit the amount of recovery in a
given case. The first limitation is related to the victim's ability to recoup the
loss from "collateral sources," because the Act requires the amount recovered from such a source to be deducted from the total economic loss incurred.2 The second limitation is a $10,000 ceiling on the total award arising
out of a single incident. 25 In addition, the award is to be reduced by the first
196. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.

444, 460 (1964). See also T.

SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY

298 (1964).
197. As, for example, by destruction of an individual's small business.
198. Lamborn, supra note 122, at 27.
199. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 120 (1973).
200. An assumption underlying the Act is that those who can afford insurance coverage for
personal injuries will not refrain from purchasing it on the basis of the coverage afforded by the
Act. This assumption is equally applicable to the purchase of property insurance.
201. Lamborn,supra note 122, at 28.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 27.
204. MINN. STAT. § 299B.04(l) (1974).

205. Id. §299B.04(3).
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$100 of loss"°' and by an amount commensurate with the contributory mis207
conduct of the victim.
a. Collateral Source
The Act provides that the total amount awarded will equal the economic
loss reduced to the extent the loss is recouped from a "collateral source.' '205
Collateral source is defined as "a source of benefits or advantages for economic loss otherwise reparable ... which the victim or claimant has received,
or which is readily available to him .... '209 The Act then enumerates the
sources which are considered to be collateral, including benefits from the
offender, certain governmental agencies, social security, medicare, medicaid,
state-required temporary non-occupational disability insurance, workers'
compensation, employer wage continuation programs, insurance proceeds,
prepaid hospital or health service care or disability benefit contracts, and private gifts and donations. 210 This enumeration, however, raises several problems, as does the phrase "readily available."
(1) Sources of Recovery
The Act provides that "collateral sources" include benefits from the United
States government or one of its agencies, or a state or an instrumentality of
two or more states.2 t This provision could be interpreted to include unemployment compensation, monthly welfare and Veterans Administration
benefits, and regular Social Security payments. The reason for deducting
benefits from collateral sources, however, is to prevent a victim from profiting from double recovery of benefits.212 The intent of the entire Act is merely
to recompense the victim for actual crime-related expenses.2 1I The collateral
funds enumerated in the Act do not involve payments which the victim would
have received whether or not a crime had been committed but only those payments from "a source of benefits ... for economic loss. ' ' 21 Since economic
21
loss is not recoverable unless it is the direct result of a criminal act, it
appears that the purpose of the Act is only to deduct benefits from collateral
sources which were made directly as a result of losses incurred as a result of
the injury or death from a crime.216
206. Id. § 299B.04(2).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 299B.04(l).
209. Id. § 299B.02(4).
210. Id. §§299B.02(4)(a)-(i).
211. Id. § 299B.02(4)(b).
212. Cameron, Compensation for Victims of Crime: The New Zealand Experiment,
12 J. PUB. L. 367, 374 (1963).

213. See Lamborn, supra note 122, at 66 & n.293; 2 HAWAII
7-8 (1970).
214. MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(4) (1974).
215. See id. §§299B.02(7), (9).

CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSA-

TION COMM'N, ANN. REP.

216. The attorney general has stated that free medical care given to an indigent victim is a
collateral source under the Act and, therefore, the medical center could not recover the cost
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"[P]roceeds of a contract of insurance payable to the victim for economic
loss which he sustained because of the crime"2 7 and proceeds of a contract
for prepaid hospital and health care services 218 are also listed as "collateral
sources." Because the crime victims program is considered to be an alternative means of compensation, the program is unnecessary where insurance
covers a victim's loss. Allowing a claimant to recover where he has an adequate existing source would, arguably, allow a profit to be made from the
crime at the taxpayers' expense.21 9 Yet injustice will arise because one is
penalized for having the foresight to obtain private coverage. It has even been
suggested that confining benefits to the uninsured "may be so discriminatory
as to be unconstitutional ' 220 and that the compensation of the rich and the
poor alike is preferable to characterizing the awards as charity to the needy.
The resulting economic burden upon the state if insured claimants were
eligible for compensation is difficult to determine. Therefore, to weigh this
burden against the benefits derived from encouraging individuals to provide
privately for unforeseeable losses caused by the commission of a crime is
impossible. Burdening the taxpayers in cases where the claimant has not
taken advantage of other sources either provided by society or by an employer
as a cost of doing business does not seem necessary. But insurance coverage
is a matter of personal choice, based largely upon financial ability and it
clearly seems to be beyond the Board's power to decide whether insurance
was a "readily available" collateral source to a claimant who has no such
coverage. The Board will have to proceed on the assumption, whether valid
or not, that those who can afford to do so will have taken out private insur22
ance. 1
Life insurance proceeds are not included within the definition of collateral
sources. 22 This exclusion is justifiable on the grounds that a maximum award
either as a purchaser or supplier of medical services, products, or accommodations. Op. Minn.
Att'y Gen. 1032 (Feb. 6, 1976), reprintedin 9 MINNESOTA LEGAL REGISTER 10 (1976).
217. MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(4)(g) (1974).
218. Id. § 299B.02(4)(h).
219. "[Ilt was not the intention of the Legislature that the injured party be paid twice."
Lamborn, supra note 122, at 66, quoting I ONTARIO CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD,
ANN. REP. 14 (1971). Accord, Cameron, supra note 212, at 374.
220. Round Table- Compensation For Victims of Criminal Violence, 8 J. PUB. L. 191, 210
(1959) (comments of H. Weihofen).
221. A possible solution to avoid penalizing those who have purchased insurance would be to
deduct the premiums paid on the policy from the amount received thereunder and then to deduct
the adjusted amount from the total economic loss. For example, if a policy owner paid $3,000 in
premiums for health insurance and received $20,000 on it as a result of the crime, the Board
could deduct the premiums from the amount received, leaving $17,000. If the total loss were
$25,000 and the claimant had no other collateral sources, the Board could deduct the $17,000
from the $25,000 total loss and $8,000 would be compensable under the program. This may prove
to be the most equitable result for the claimant under the circumstances and would prevent undue
burdens on the taxpayers. See Lamborn, supra note 122, at 68, citing CANADIAN CORRECTIONS
ASSOCIATION,

COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS

OF CRIME AND

RESTITUTION

BY OFFENDERS

13

(Feb. 22, 1968).
222. MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(4) (1974).
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from the Board, if added to the proceeds of a life insurance policy, will never
fully compensate the claimant for losses suffered as a result of the victim's
death. In addition, to deprive the survivors of the benefit of their vested
interest in a life insurance policy merely because the victim died as a result of
the commission of a crime would be unfair. The exclusion was also patterned
after the procedure in actions for wrongful death where life insurance is not
a consideration in awarding payment22 and appears to be sound.
(2) "Readily Available"
A "collateral source" under the Act can be one which the victim or claimant has received or one which is "readily available to him. '24 The term
"readily available ' 25 is ambiguous. Perhaps it refers to sources which the
claimant knows exist for his benefit; or perhaps to those which exist and are
available whether or not the claimant knows of their existence. It also may
refer to sources which will become available to the claimant more quickly
than would an award from the Board. More specifically, a determination
must be made as to whether this provision places a duty upon the claimant to
at least apply for recovery from the collateral source; if so, whether the
claimant must exhaust all appeals available from an adverse decision by the
organization or agency to whom an application for a collateral source has
been made; and, what happens to the claimant's claim before the Board during the period an application for recovery from the collateral source is
pending.
The primary reason for subtracting collateral source payments from an
award under the Act appears to be the placement of the financial burden
initially upon sources other than the state. 226 Recovery under the Act is then
one of last resort, and the term "readily available" should be interpreted with
this end in mind.
As a first step, the claimant should be made aware of all potential sources
of recovery for the type of economic loss he has suffered. The claimant may
have private sources of recovery, but be unaware of public sources. Thus, to
maximize reliance on collateral sources, the Board should inform each
claimant of the existence of public sources. This is only indirectly attempted
now by requiring the claimant to complete a form 27 to indicate from which of
223. See, e.g., Wright v. Engelbert, 193 Minn. 509, 513, 259 N.W. 75, 77-78 (1935).
224. MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(4) (1974).

225. The term was adopted from the

UNIFORM CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT §

l(d).

Tape of Meeting on S.F. 884 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law & Corrections of the
MinnesotaSenate Comm. on the Judiciary(Oct. 9, 1973).

226. The purpose of the Act is not frustrated because the individual with no or limited sources
of compensation remains protected. See Tape of Meeting on S.F. 884 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Law & Corrections of the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 9, 1973).

227. Minn. Dep't of Public Safety Form No. 8004 (Mar., 1976) lists the following as collat-

eral sources: payments from the offender; social security; medicare; medicaid; workers' compensation; employer's wage continuation program; insurance; health care or disability program;
federal, state, or local governments; and donation or gift. There is also space for the claimant to
indicate recovery from other sources.
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the specified or other sources funds have been received or are readily available.
After the claimant is made aware of the potential sources, a determination
must be made as to which sources are "readily available" so as to permit a
deduction from total economic loss. The question arises whether or not a
claimant must take affirmative steps to obtain funds from the collateral
sources of which he is aware in order for them to be considered "readily
available." In the area of insurance law, there exists a split of authority on
the question of whether a claimant has a duty to apply to a collateral source
where the language of a policy requires any amount "payable" from such
sources to be deducted from the policy award. 228 One view is that an implied
duty exists, whereby the insured must take reasonable steps to seek reimbursement from these sources." 9 A claimant thus cannot prevent funds from
being "payable" by this "unjustified inaction.." 30 The other view is that no
such obligation can be implied, because of the court's inability to formulate
guidelines establishing the degree of effort which must be expended in pursuing the claim.21' In most instances, a claimant is likely to turn to other
sources before turning to the Act, especially where the loss incurred is substantial vis-A-vis the statutory recovery limitation. In those cases where he
does not, and the Board feels the claimant would qualify for such collateral
recovery, the Board should be able to impose a duty to apply. However, the
Board's award should be delayed only until an initial decision is made by the
agency or organization to which application had been made. Requiring a
delay past an initial decision from the collateral source and requiring the
claimant to pursue recovery upon appeal would appear to transgress the
plain meaning of "readily available." The Board could then grant the award32

228. Compare, e.g., Callaway v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 248 A.2d 617 (Del. Super. Ct.
1968) with, e.g., Burkett v. Continental Cas. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 360, 76 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1969).
229. See Callaway v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 248 A.2d 617, 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968).
230. Id.
231. See Burkett v. Continental Cas. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 360, 363, 76 Cal. Rptr. 476, 478
(1969).
232. A claimant with an urgent need for the reparations award need not wait until there has
been an initial decision by the collateral source since the Board has the power to make an emergency award where it appears the grant will probably be made and that undue hardship would
result if immediate payment were not made. MINN. STAT. § 299B.06, subd. 2(g) (1974). Minnesota has wisely chosen not to limit the amount of the emergency award. Some states have
limited the amount. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.120(1) (Supp. 1975) ($1,500); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 26A, § 11 (1973) ($500); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 630 (McKinney 1972) ($500). The period of time
for which an emergency award will be made depends on the factors in each case. Thus, if it
appears that a claim will take a short time to be processed or if the claimant has income from a
collateral source, a small emergency award will be made. If the case will take a protracted period
of time to determine, however, or if the claimant is still being treated for his injuries, an award
for four to six months may be granted. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of
the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24,
1976. Where an emergency award is not involved, the Board now waits for a final decision by the
collateral source before it makes an award under the Act. Id.
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and can protect itself in either instance by exercising its right of subrogation 233 wherein the claimant must agree to cooperate with the Board.2 3' In
addition, the Board may reopen any award upon discovery that a claimant
23
has subsequently received an award from a collateral source. 1
b. Maximum Limit
The overall effect of the deduction of benefits recovered from "collateral
sources" is to greatly decrease the taxpayers' burden of financing the compensation program. 236 Another attempt to limit the cost of the program is the
statutory $10,000 maximum limit on recovery per incident. Without an upper
limit, crime victims reparations programs might eventually prove to be too
expensive to maintain, although several practical and persuasive arguments
can be made against its retention.
First, the limit is arbitrary. An entire award of $10,000 can be consumed
by about three months of hospital care, without any allowance for items such
as doctors' fees, x-rays, operations, support loss, physical therapy, or past and
future earnings. 237 In addition, under the present limitation, a family with one
dependent would be able to recover the same amount as a family with several
dependents because the limit is applied per incident. 23 1 Furthermore, the
absence of coverage for pain and suffering, 39 which usually drastically raises

233. MINN. STAT. § 299B.10 (1974) subrogates the state to "the claimant's rights to recover
benefits or advantages for economic loss" from available or readily available sources.
234. 9 MINN. REGS., REPAR. BOARD RB7-(b)(1974).
235. MINN. STAT. § 299B.06, subd. 2(h) (1974) gives the Board the power to "reconsider any
decision granting or denying reparations or determining their amount."
236. As a result of the adoption of a provision by the 1972 Hawaii legislature for the deduction
of collateral sources from the final award, payment for medical expenses went down from 35.6
percent to 12.7 percent and the amount of the average award dropped from $2,443.14 to $1,416.09.
5 HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMM'N, ANN. REP. 15 (1972). In Alaska twothirds of the claims denied were because of recovery from collateral sources. I ALASKA VIOLENT
CRIMES COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP. 10(1973).
237. The average hospital cost per day in Minnesota in 1973 was $94.54, well below the
national average of $114.56. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS 56-57
(1975). At that rate, a $10,000 award would be completely exhausted within 106 days from
hospital charges alone. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota, which cover approximately
one-quarter of the population, reported the average daily hospital charge in 1975 to be $138.61,
up 15.3% over 1974 figures. The Minneapolis Star, Apr. 16, 1976, § A, at 16, col. 4. The maximum award would thus be absorbed within 73 days.
238. MINN. STAT. § 299B.04(3) (1974).
239. Reparations acts in most other states do not provide compensation for pain and suffering. Minnesota appears to follow this trend by not specifically including pain and suffering
within the definition of "injury." Furthermore, recovery for pain and suffering cannot be
implied since the Act only allows recovery for "economic loss," whereas the concept of pain and
suffering usually involves an intangible personal loss rather than an economic loss. While "pain
and suffering" itself is not within the ambit of recovery under the Act, parts of the concept may
give rise to compensation under other provisions of the Act. At common law, for instance, pain
and suffering includes loss of dignity, loss of expectation of happiness, loss of opportunity and
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the cost of a program,240 mitigates against the need for maintaining an upper
limit. Finally, based on the experience of other states, excessive increases in
the total cost of the program are not an inevitable result of the elimination of
the maximum limit on recovery. In one year in Hawaii, only five of 164
awards were cut off at the maximum limit.241 Eighteen percent of the awards
in New York242 and 14 percent in New Jersey 4 ' are for the maximum amount.
The experience of the Board in Minnesota has been consistent with the experiences of these other states. "
Convincing legislators to approve a completely open-ended program would
be extremely difficult. At present "[t]here is general agreement that the
amounts of awards in a tax supported program should be less than jury verdicts in personal injury lawsuits.""24 Yet some form of compromise might
be possible. One alternative is to impose a lower maximum limit for each
dependent where multiple dependents file claims on the death of a crime
victim. An even better approach would be to remove the upper limit on
medical benefits and impose the existing limit only on other losses. With

faculties. Lamborn,supra note 122, at 33-34. If these losses result in a mental injury of the nature
covered by the "mental or nervous" shock provision of the Act, economic losses incurred from
such an injury would be compensable.
240. Floyd, Massachusetts' Plan to Aid Victims of Crime, 48 BOsTON U.L. REV. 360, 368
(1968). Similarly, the experience has been that in cases involving pain and suffering insurance
settlements have often been disproportionately high in relation to the actual physical injury
suffered. Accident victims, aware of the difficulty of determining the value of pain and suffering
with any precision, often pad their medical bills, confident they will recover many times that
amount. Insurance companies, faced with a large number of small claims in which the value of
pain and suffering must be determined, end up pouring a disproportionate amount of the insurance pool into satisfying those nuisance claims rather than litigating them. See J. O'CONNELL &
R. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING: WHO WANTS WHAT, WHEN & WHY? 6 (1972).
Furthermore, the experience of the Hawaii Criminal Injuries Compensation Commission has
produced similar results. Thirty-eight percent of Hawaii's awards in a one-year period were for
pain and suffering. 5 HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMM'N, ANN. REP. 15 (1973).
The Hawaii Board has indicated that the most difficult aspect of its deliberations is recovery for
pain and suffering and has questioned the desirability of this type of compensation. I HAWAII
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMM'N, ANN. REP. 4-5 (1969).
241. 5 HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMM'N, ANN. REP. app. A.l-10 (1972).
Compensation under the Hawaii act is limited to $10,000. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-62(b)
(1968).
242. Lamborn, supra note 122, at 53. The maximum limit of $15,000 applies only to awards
for loss of earnings or support. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
243. 1NEW JERSEY VIOLENT CRIMES COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP. 3 (1973).
244. During the first two years the program was in operation, only three out of 269 awards
were for the maximum amount. Board Register, supra note 72, addendum #2. One explanation
given for this low percentage is that in those cases where a victim has died and left dependents,
they have been eligible under the Social Security Act for survivor's benefits. See Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1970). The amount received under the Social Security Act is then
deducted as a collateral source from the total amount of the economic loss incurred. Letter from
Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to
William Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976.
245. Comment, Compensation for Victims of Crime, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 531, 550 (1966).
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rapidly-rising medical and hospital expenses,246 it seems only realistic to
exclude medical expenses from those losses which fall under the arbitrary
maximum limitation. This would better serve the program goal of benefiting
those least able to bear these unexpected expenses. In New York, where there
are no medical limitations, the Board has not found the additional cost to be
7
either exhorbitant or prohibitive.
Another change which should be carefully considered is an expansion of
the Board's power to allow it to reconsider its decisions granting or denying
reparations or determining their amount.2 4 Thus, upon determining that the
claimants had used the entire amount of the award for medical expenses and
support, and after satisfying itself that the claimants had exhausted all other
possible financial sources, the Board could go beyond the maximum limitation and award periodic payments for loss of earnings or support. The latter
amount could be limited by the median income of a like-sized family in the
area 249 and the Board could be required to make periodic reinvestigations to
determine when circumstances had changed sufficiently so that the relief
could be terminated.
A further possibility would be to remove the maximum limit whenever a
"good Samaritan" or his dependent has filed a claim. This would be an
appropriate way of recognizing the efforts of a "good Samaritan" who has
risked the possibility of injury or death in an effort to benefit the public
safety. 5
246. From 1960 to 1975 the consumer price index for medical care in general rose from 79.1

to 166.8 and for hospital semiprivate rooms from 57.3 to 230.1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 423 (96th ed. 1975). See note 237 supra for the
rate of increase for hospital charges alone in Minnesota.
247. Tape ofJoint Meeting on S.F. 884 Before the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
and the Minnesota House Comm. on Crime Prevention & Corrections (Nov. 13, 1973) (remarks
of Stanley Van Rensselaer, Chairman of the New York Crime Victims Compensation Board).
248. MINN. STAT. § 299B.06, subd. 2(h) (1974).
249. Lamborn, supra note 122, at 51-52.
250. While the Act provides compensation for economic loss incurred as a result of an attempt
to prevent a crime or to apprehend a person suspected of engaging in a crime, see MINN. STAT.
§§ 299B.02(9)(b)-(c) (1974) (definition of "victim"), Minnesota law permits recovery of $50,000,
without proof of loss, by the spouse or dependent parents or children of a "peace officer" killed
in the line of duty. Id. §§ 352E.01-.05 (Supp. 1975). Peace officer is defined to mean, inter alia, a
"good samaritan" who complies with the request or direction of a peace officer to assist him.
Id. § 352E.01, subd. 2(h). Thus a "good samaritan" under the "peace officer act" can qualify as
a "victim" under the Crime Victims Reparations Act. The scopes of the two acts differ, however,
because one provides limited recovery for otherwise uncompensated loss and the other operates,
in effect, as a life insurance policy on the victim. Both acknowledge the benefit to the public as a
whole by the efforts of a "good samaritan."
In addition, it is unlikely that recovery of the $50,000 under the "peace officer act" could be
deducted as a collateral source. First, the analogy to a life insurance contract would require
exclusion from the definition of "collateral source." See notes 222-23 supra and accompanying
text. More importantly, collateral source "means a source of benefits or advantages for economic loss .... MINN. STAT. § 299B.02(4) (1974). (Emphasis added.) Recovery under the
"peace officer act" is not dependent on economic loss.
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c. ContributoryMisconduct
The amount of any award is to be reduced "to the extent ...that the
board deems reasonable because of the contributory misconduct of the claimant or of a victim through whom he claims .... ,,25The provision, in
essence, establishes a pure comparative fault scheme, whereby the Board may
set the contributory misconduct at anywhere from 100 -percent to zero percent. 252 The term "contributory misconduct" is not defined in the Act,
although the reparations acts of other states reduce or deny recovery where
the behavior or involvement of the victim has contributed to his injury or
death.253 In all cases, an attempt to prevent a crime or to apprehend a person
suspected of engaging in a crime will not be considered contributory misconduct. 25 4 Because of the breadth of the term "contributory misconduct,"
the Board should consider a number of factors to determine whether sufficient
reason exists to reduce the claimant's award, such as whether there was provocation, consent, involvement in illegal activities, or any other intentional or
negligent actions which in any way contributed to or increased the victim's
injury.
G. Attorneys' Role and Fees
The original Act contained no provision for attorneys' fees or for the role
of attorneys in the program, 25 5 a possible indication of the legislature's desire
251. MINN. STAT. § 299B.04(2) (1974).
252. Since the Board may reduce an award without limit to the extent commensurate with the
victim's contributory conduct, it is conceivable that an award could be completely denied. See
H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 147-48 (1974) which
illustrates a 10% reduction of an award by the Hawaii commission to the survivors of a victim
whose death resulted from his illicit participation in prostitution. In New York the degree of the
victim's contributory misconduct does not cause a proportional reduction of the award. Instead,
the misconduct is assessed and the award is made or denied altogether. Id. at 54-55.
253. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.080(c) (1974) (provocation, consent, and other contributory
conduct); CAL.GOV'T CODE §§ 13964(a), (c) (West Supp. 1976) (knowing or willful participation
in the crime); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 9006(c) (Supp. 1975) (victim bears any share of responsibility that caused his injury); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-31(c) (Supp. 1975) (victim's responsibility for injury or death); Act of June 6, 1976, act 139, § 2, [19761 Pa. Legis. Serv. 278 (West),
to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, 180-7.8(o (conduct which contributed to infliction of
victim's injury); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.12A (Supp. 1976) (conduct which contributed to
infliction of victim's injury); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.070(3)(a) (Supp. 1976) (consent,
provocation, or incitement); Act of June 6, 1976, ch. 344, § 3, [1976] Wis. Legis. Serv. 1621
(West), to be codified as Wis. STAT. § 949.06(5) (victim contributed to infliction of his injury or
death). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-12 (Supp. 1976) (contributory misconduct merely a
permissive factor to be considered).
254. If it were otherwise, the effect of the definition of "victim" under the Act would be
emasculated. MINN. STAT.§§299B.02(9)(b)-(c) (1974) define a victim as:
[A] person who suffers personal injury or death as a direct result of ... (b) the good
faith effort of any person to prevent a crime; or (c) the good faith effort of any person
to apprehend a person suspected of engaging in a crime.
255. Such provisions vary among other jurisdictions, with attorney participation ranging from
II to 90 percent and varying fees being taken from either the award or the program. In New
York, one out of five claimants was represented by attorneys, mostly in death cases. 4 NEw
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to keep the proceedings as informal as possible."' 6 In 1975, however, the Act
was amended to allow the Board to "limit the fee charged by an attorney for
representing a claimant before the board." 2 7 The amendment thus allows the
Board, on its own initiative, to interfere with the contractual agreement
between the claimant and the attorney on a case-by-case basis. 5
BOARD, ANN. REP. 7 (1970). In Hawaii, from 10 to 22
percent of the claimants have been represented by attorneys. EDELHERTZ & GEIS, supra note 252
at 147. In Maryland, more than 90 percent of the claims are filed by attorneys. 4 MARYLAND
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP. 10 (1973). In Hawaii, if the award is less
than $1,000, the amount of the fee is set at the discretion of the Board. If greater than $1,000, the
fee cannot be more than 15 percent, with the amount taken from the award. HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 351-16 (1968). In New Jersey, the Board may allow reasonable fees up to 15 percent of the
amount awarded to be paid in addition to the compensation award. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-8
(Supp. 1975). In Minnesota, a 1974 conference committee eliminated a provision that the Board
had the right to determine reasonable attorneys' fees. Note 61 supra.
256. Board hearings are not required for every claim. MINN. STAT. § 299B.07, subd. 3 (1974).
Of course one of the purposes of eliminating a mandatory hearing for every claim is to allow
expeditious determination of the claim. See Tape ofJoint Meeting on S.F. 884 Before the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryand the Minnesota House Comm. on Crime Prevention &
Corrections (Nov. 13, 1973) (remarks of Stanley Van Rensselaer, Chairman of the New York
Crime Victims Compensation Board). It is expected that most cases will not reach the hearing
stage and can be resolved by considering police, medical, and investigative reports as well as
information from the claimant. For example, in the year immediately preceding passage of the
Minnesota Act less than 25% of the New York Board decisions required a full hearing. Compare
7 NEW YORK CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP. 17 (1973) (83 board hearings)
with id. at 13 (1887 decisions). Even when a hearing is necessary, attorneys are generally "inappropriately legalistic for the informal atmosphere normally maintained in the hearings." H.
EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 252, at 57.
257. MINN. STAT. § 299B.071 (Supp. 1975). But see MINN. STAT. § 549.01 (1974) (client may
enter into an agreement with attorney regarding fees). In making a determination of the fees
which can be charged by an attorney, the Board may consider work actually done, the claimant's
financial situation and the type of award made. This is the approach taken by the New York
Commission, with the qualification that attorneys' fees are approved only when the claim includes loss of earnings or support or when part of the medical expenses have been paid by the
YORK CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION

claimant. H.

EDELHERTZ

& G. GELS, supra note 252, at 56-57.

A Minnesota Senate bill as originally introduced in 1973 provided that the compensation
award could include reasonable attorneys' fees. S.F. 884, 68th Minn. Legis., IstSess. § 8, subd. 6
(1973). This was a necessary aspect of compensating the victim because considerable fees could
be expected as the bill also provided that the claim would be heard by the district court, not by a
reparations board. See id. § 7, subd. 1.Although not mandated by statute, the Minnesota Crime
Victims Reparations Board has decided it does not have the power to grant attorneys' fees in
addition to the basic compensation award. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director
of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Sept. 1,
1976. But cf.MINN. STAT. § 176.51I, subd. 3 (Supp. 1975) (workers' compensation commission
may award attorneys' fees incurred for review of affirmed compensation award).
258. State statutes limiting prospectively the compensation of an attorney for the processing
of a claim have been upheld under a variety of acts as a valid regulation of the practice of law.
See Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925) (Holmes, J.) (workers' compensation; state, as incident of granting the privilege to practice law, may attach reasonable conditions to the collection of attorneys' fees); Sarja v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 154 Minn. 217, 191 N.W. 742, cert.
denied, 262 U.S. 754, appeal dismissed for want ofjurisdiction per curiam sub nom. Swanson v.
Sarja, 263 U.S. 685 (1923) (fee limitation provisions of workers' compensation act valid); Blair
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The intention of the amendment was to protect those claimants with more
complicated cases who retain counsel from paying exhorbitant fees. But the
amendment is ambiguous. It is possible to interpret the phrase "representing
a claimant before the board" as covering only appearances by an attorney at
a hearing in front of the entire Board, because the Act defines "board" as the
three members only 59 and does not extend it to the Board's staff or to a single
member of the Board. Under this interpretation, it would not be within the
power of the Board to limit attorneys' fees in those cases where a full Board
hearing was never held. Yet the term "representing" would seem to include
all preparations for an eventual hearing as well as the appearance in front of
the Board. Consequently, the amendment apparently did not clearly accomplish its intended purpose because it may empower the Board to limit fees
only in those relatively rare instances where a hearing before the full Board is
conducted.
H. Publicity
"A major shortcoming of every [reparations] program is that most of its
customers, victims of violent crime, are not aware of it."2 6° In no state has
information regarding the program reached a majority of the victims of
crime.2"' Although the legislature's relatively small initial appropriation for
v. Village of Coleraine, 180 Minn. 388, 231 N.W. 193 (1930) (same statute controls where parties
have contingency agreement which provided for greater compensation). See also Capital Trust
Co. v. Calhoun, 250 U.S. 208 (1919) (percentage limitation in federal statute on compensation
for attorneys for processing of Civil War claims upheld as valid incident of regulation of federal
funds); Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170 (1920) (Brandeis, J.) (5-4 decision) (same).
It is an open question, however, whether the fee-limiting provisions of the Act could be applied
retroactively without violating constitutional prohibitions against the impairment of contracts.
See Fry v. Wolfe, 106 Okla. 289, 293, 234 P. 191, 194 (1924) (by implication) (retroactive
application of statute altering attorney-client contract invalid); U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10 ("No
State shall ... pass any ...Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... ); MINN. CONST. art.

1,§ I I ("No ...law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed .... ). But see
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (mortgage moratorium). See generally Note, Moratory Legislation for the Relief of Mortgagors, 18 MINN. L. REV. 319, 322-26
nn.12-17 (1934). The issue is complicated, however, by the fact that state monies are involved.
The contract is thus not one merely involving the rights of the victim against a private individual.
The federal decisions mentioned above, although not by nature dealing with the contract clause
since that clause only proscribes activities by the states, do concern the limitation of recovery
of attorneys' fees as a part of the regulation of the use of public monies. This precedent might add
support to a less restrictive reading of the contract clause in this instance since state monies are
involved. See also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (semble) (state apparently
given greater leeway to alter contract if it is a party to it). As a practical matter, however, it is
expected that few claims would be affected by the amendment.
259. MINN. STAT. §299B.05, subd. 1 (1974).
260. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 252, at 28 1.
261. For example, in 1974 Alaska experienced 1,269 violent crimes against the person, Hawaii
experienced 1,295, Maryland experienced 26,093, and New York experienced 133,561. U.S.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 56, 58, 60 (1974). Yet the crime

victims compensation boards of the respective states received only 50, 165, 1,500, and 2,341
inquiries or applications. See I ALASKA VIOLENT CRIMES COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP.
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the program may indicate that the legislature was not enthusiastic about
soliciting claims, 6 ' the Act contains a provision creating a statutory duty for
the Board to publicize the program" 3 and for law enforcement agencies to
inform victims of their rights under the Act.2"
No sanctions for failure to perform these statutory duties are imposed,
however, giving rise to the possibility that a victim may allege negligence by a
public official or officer for failure to inform the victim of the existence of
the program.265 This possibility of suit has led California to repeal its statutory
duty to inform.2 6 In fact, the real purpose served by the imposition of these
duties is to underscore the concern of the legislature that the program benefit
the greatest number of eligible claimants possible and to reflect a desire that
the program become an integral part of the criminal justice system.
In spite of the efforts of the Board and law enforcement agencies to publicize the program, the number of claims filed to date has been small in relation to the number of crimes actually committed. For example, during the

14 (Supp. 1974); 7

REP. 5 (1974); 5
BOARD, ANN. REP. 7 (1974); 8 NEW YORK
CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD, ANN. REP. 5 (1974).
HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMM'N, ANN.

MARYLAND CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION

262. See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 252, at 28 1.
263. Concerned that the bulk of the appropriations be used for making awards to victims of
crime and not for administrative purposes, the Board has followed the general example of other
state programs in utilizing publicity techniques which require very minimal direct expenditure
of funds. Thus, the Board has taken advantage of public service announcements in the media,
appearances before community groups, participation in police sensitivity programs, television
appearances, distribution of information to local news media and legislators whenever awards
are made to victims from the area, and publication and distribution of informational brochures
to sheriffs, chiefs of police, county attorneys, hospitals, welfare agencies, and the Minnesota
Funeral Directors Association. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the
Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976.
264. The imposition of a duty on law enforcement agencies provides an effective and efficient
method of publicity, since law enforcement agencies have prime access to those victims who
report a crime. See Lamborn, The Methods of Governmental Compensation of Victims of
Crime. 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 655, 668-71. The Minnesota Board feels that this type of contact with
law enforcement people has encouraged citizens to report crimes, thus resulting in more efficient
law enforcement and improved relations between the community and police. Letter from Samuel
L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William
Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976. Such police involvement will also hopefully lead to a
heightened awareness by law enforcement officers of the burden on crime victims. The Board
has given approximately 10,000 wallet-size cards, containing basic information regarding the
rights of a victim to file a claim under the Act, to law enforcement officers throughout the
state for distribution to crime victims. Id.
265. State and municipal governments are liable up to certain statutory limits for losses
stemming from an act or omission of an employee while performing his statutory duties unless
the employee exercised due care or the duty was discretionary. See Nieting v. Blondell,
Minn. - , 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975) (state tort immunity abolished); Act of Apr. 20, 1976, ch.
331, § 33, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1293 (state); MINN. STAT. §§466.02, .03 subds. 5-6 (1974)
(municipalities).
266. The county district attorneys, who were required to inform the crime victims of the program, provided the impetus for repeal of the statute. Lamborn, supranote 264, at 669.
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first two years of operations, 580 claims were filed," 7 while approximately
4,000 violent crimes against the person were known or reported."' The relative infancy of the program may account in part for this initial low rate of
filing.
. Confidentiality of Information on Victims
The Act provides no protection for the confidentiality of information
obtained in the course of the Board's proceedings, a problem most acute in
sex crime cases. Instead, the Act requires the Board to submit an annual
report, which is to include the names of the victims.6 9 In addition, the
Minnesota Open Meeting Law requires the meetings of the Board to be open
to the public. Furthermore, the Minnesota data privacy act requires the information regarding victims to be available to the public.
The requirement mandating the publication of the names of victims in the
annual report to the legislature and the governor seems to be unnecessary.
Because the purpose of such a report is to publicize the Board's activities and
to provide an opportunity for scrutiny, criticism, and modification of existing
policies and procedures, disclosure of the general characteristics of each case
would appear to be sufficient for the purposes of the report.7 0
The Minnesota Open Meeting Law provides that except as is otherwise
provided by law, all meetings of state boards "when required or permitted by
law to transact public business in a meeting" shall be open to the public.Y'
This law was enacted in order to protect the public against secret actions
taken at meetings, without free discussion and on the basis of undisclosed
factors. 22 Because the meetings of the Board include the assignment of claims
to members, reports of members regarding determinations of claims they
have investigated, and the discussion and adoption of program policies and
267. Board Register, supra note 72, table II.
268. See MINNESOTA

BUREAU

OF CRIMINAL

APPREHENSION,

MINNESOTA CRIME INFOR-

30, 32, 37 (1974) (113 homicides, 687 rapes, 3,221 aggravated assaults). This is a low
percentage, even when considered in view of the fact that some potential claimants may have
been deterred from filing claims because they were aware that they might not have qualified for
compensation, for example, because of victim misconduct, MINN. STAT. § 299B.04(2) (1974),
recovery from a collateral source, id. § 299B.02(4), or failure to comply with statutory loss,
id. § 299B.04, reporting, or cooperation requirements, id. § 299B.03, subds. 2(a)-(b) (1974), as
amended, Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 193, § 1, [19761 Minn. Sess. Laws 657.
269. MINN. STAT. § 299B.06, subd. 1(e) (1974).
270. On April 30, 1976, the Board adopted a policy not to include the names of rape victims
in the register. This decision was made with full knowledge that it was in violation of the Board's
statutory duty but the Board felt that, in good judgment, it had to take such action. Upon a
proper showing, the name of a rape victim will be made available. Board Register, supra note 72,
table i.
271. MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1974).
MATION

272. Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 63-a-5 (Oct. 28, 1974), reprintedin 7 MINN.

LEGAL REGISTER

40

(1974).
273. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims
Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976. Minutes are kept of every
meeting.
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guidelines, 7 3 there is little question that the meetings are required to be open
to the public.274 Yet it is difficult to argue that the purposes of the Act are
being served where the discussion involves details which identify the individual
who has been a victim of a sex crime. Although there are indications that
protection of the confidentiality of certain types of claims in order not to
discourage sex crime victims from filing claims is not repugnant to the public's right to know how an agency makes public policy decisions,275 it is likely
that in order to solve this problem, special legislation exempting the Board
from the provisions of the Open Meeting Law is the appropriate remedy for
the Board to pursue.
The classification of Board documents as "public" under the state privacy
act0* mandates a similar remedy. Pursuant to the data privacy act, the Board's
files must be open to the public. This act establishes three classifications of
"data on individuals ' 2 77 kept by state agencies-public, private, and confidential. All data that is not made non-public by a state or federal law is considered to be "public data. 278 "Private data" is that which is not public but
is accessible to the data subject;2 79 whereas "confidential data" is that which
is not public and not accessible to the data subject.28 0 To make data nonpublic where it has not been made so by state or federal law the Board may
apply for a temporary emergency non-public classification from the state com274. See Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 63-a-5 (Oct. 28, 1974), reprinted in 7 MINN. LEGAL REGISTER
40-42 (1974). All meetings are open to the public and notice of the meetings are sent to the press
room at the State Capitol, the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety, Board members,
and the attorney general's office. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner, Executive Director of the
Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William Mitchell Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976.
The Board is confident that the press will continue its usual practice of not publishing the names
of rape victims. Id.
275. Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 125-a-64 (Dec. 4, 1972), reprintedin 5 MINN. LEGAL REGISTER
93-94 (1972), approved the exclusion of the public from parts of county welfare board meetings
pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the commissioner of public welfare intended to assure
the confidentiality of certain information on public assistance recipients. In balancing the
public's right to be informed against the individual's right to privacy it distinguished between
the public interest in disclosure of public policy decisions and the public interest in disclosure
of details regarding "ministerial decisions of public agencies relating to the application of
public policy to particular individuals." Because the commissioner's regulation only affected
ministerial decisions the attorney general concluded the individual's interest in privacy prevailed. This reasoning applies to similar aspects of meetings by the Crime Victims Reparations
Board.
276. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162-.169 (Supp. 1975), as amended, Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 283,
[1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1063.
277. This term covers all "records, files and processes" in which an individual is or can be
identified. MINN. STAT. § 15.162, subd. 3 (Supp. 1975).
278. Compare MINN. STAT. § 15.162, subd. 5b (Supp. 1975) with Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch.
283, §§ 2, 4, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1063, 1064.
279. Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 283, § 4, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1064, amending MINN. STAT.
§ 15.162, subd. 5(a) (Supp. 1975).
280. Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 283, § 2, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1063, to be codified as
MINN. STAT. § 15.162, subd. 2a.
281. Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 283, § 8, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1065, to be codified as
MINN. STAT. § 15.642.
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missioner of administration." ' The Board would have to prove that "the
data on individuals has been treated as either private or confidential by
custom of long standing which has been recognized by other similar state
agencies ... and by the public. ' 2 2 Due to the newness of the program,2 2 this
burden will be difficult to overcome.
In any case, the emergency classification would be effective only until
June 30, 1977.2 s1 Therefore, if the Board desires to obtain a non-public classification, the more effective approach is to seek a legislative remedy. Upon
amendment of the Act permitting classification of data as private, the use and
dissemination of the information would be limited to "that necessary for the
administration and management of programs specifically authorized by the
legislature .... ,,285 Because summary data made from private information,
but from which the individual's identity is not ascertainable, 26 would still be
available to the public, 22 both public and private needs would be satisfied by
the amendment. Should the Act remain as it is, the public will gain little
additional information from examining these documents, while victims of sex
crimes may well be discouraged from filing claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act exemplifies a growing
recognition of the plight of the innocent victim of crime. The Act is the result
of an effort to provide adequate coverage for the victim without placing an
undue burden on public funds. While some of the language of the Act is subject to a variety of interpretations, the strength of the Act rests in the latitude
these ambiguities provide the Board in considering claims. The Board's duty
to publicize the Act, the duty of law enforcement agencies to inform crime
victims of their rights under the Act, and the utilization of uncomplicated and
informal administrative procedures provide the means essential to insure that
recovery under the broad provisions of the Act be made readily accessible to
the victim of crime when other resources are unavailable. In a practical way,
the Act reflects a humanitarian policy of which all those within the state
are beneficiaries.
282. Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 283, § 8, [19761 Minn. Sess. Laws 1065, to be codified as
15.1642, subd. 2.
283. It is the policy of the Board to make available to the public only that information in a
claimant's file which is required to be included in the annual report to be submitted to the legislature and the governor pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 299B.06, subd. l(e) (1974). However, a
claimant has access at all times to all information in the file. See letter from Samuel L. Scheiner,
Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to Richard L.
Creighton, Director of Management Information Systems, State of Minnesota, July 10, 1975.
In addition, the state auditor, the Board members, the Executive Director, and other personnel
employed by the Board have complete access to the files. Letter from Samuel L. Scheiner,
Executive Director of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board to William Mitchell
Law Review, Aug. 24, 1976.
284. Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 283, § 8, subd. 3, [1976] Minn. Sess. Laws 1066.
285. MINN. STAT. § 15.1641(b) (Supp. 1975).
286. Id. § 15.162, subd. 9.
287. Id. § 15.1641(d).
MINN. STAT. §
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